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The Center for Business and Economic
Research (CBER) is proud to publish the 25th
Kentucky Annual Economic Report.  The Annual
Report is one of the important ways in which the
Center fulfills its mission to monitor and analyze
the Kentucky economy.  The 1997 Report contains
seven articles that provide economic forecasts and
address many of the major economic policy issues
facing Kentuckians today.
Again this year we draw mainly upon the
expertise of the faculty at the University of Kentucky.
All but one article is either authored or coauthored
by University of Kentucky economists.  We are also
pleased to publish an article from the Kentucky
Office of Financial Management and Economic
Analysis detailing the state budget forecasts.  This
Annual Report is edited by Steve Allen, who was
recently hired as a full-time research associate at
the Center.
The first article details the structure of
Kentucky’s average per capita income compared to
the U.S. average.  I show that while Kentucky’s level
falls below the national average, the gap has been
narrowing over time.  I also detail several ways in
which Kentucky might raise its per capita income.
Foremost among these is to increase the education
level of Kentucky’s workforce.
The second article contains employment,
income, and population forecasts based upon the
University of Kentucky State Econometric Model.
This model was constructed and is maintained by
Dr. Eric C. Thompson, who was recently named
Associate Director of the Center.  In this article, Dr.
Thompson provides quarterly forecasts for the next
three years.  He forecasts that gross state product
will grow 2.4 percent in 1997 and forecasts that
total employment will grow 1.8 percent.
Manoj Shanker, an economist in the
Commonwealth of Kentucky Office of Financial
Management and Economic Analysis, discusses the
forecasting of Kentucky state government revenues.
In outlining the forecasting process, he details the
various components of the state General Fund and
notes the small error between the estimated and
actual revenues.
In the fourth article, Dr. J. Robert Gillette
provides an overview of the U.S. economy’s
performance in 1996 and outlines its prospects for
1997.  He notes that gross domestic product should
From the Director. . .
average just above two
percent growth, while
inflation and unemployment
continue to remain low.
Dr. William H. Hoyt and
Kathleen Toma, a graduate
student in economics at the University of Kentucky,
discuss the coming difficulties of welfare reform in
Kentucky.  They point out that with the passage of
the federal welfare reform act, Kentucky will
assume greater responsibility in administering
welfare programs, receiving block grants instead
of entitlements and facing new and potentially
costly work requirements for recipients.
In the sixth article, Dr. Dan A. Black and
Amitabh Chandra, also a graduate student in
economics, discuss the often controversial case for
tuition increases at public universities in Kentucky.
They indicate that increases would give public
universities more of a competitive stance when
recruiting students and faculty.
Finally, Dr. Michael Webb, chair of the
Department of Economics at the University of
Kentucky, examines the increasing
internationalization of the Kentucky economy.  He
notes that foreign-affiliated firms provided 61,000
jobs in Kentucky in 1995 and points out that
Kentucky direct exports now account for seven
percent of state income.
Over the past year we have continued to build
our research program at the Center.  In 1996, we
began an affiliation with Basil-Blackwell Publishers
for marketing, production, and distribution of our
scholarly journal, Growth and Change.  We have
recently completed research projects for the
Commonwealth of Kentucky Governor’s Office for
Policy and Management, Kentucky Utilities, Inc.,
the U.S. Agency for Health Care Policy and
Research, the Downtown Somerset (Kentucky)
Development Corporation, and the Kentucky
Department of Employment Services.  Some of our
current research includes projects for the Kentucky
Transportation Cabinet, the Kentucky Department
of Employment Services, and the Kentucky
Administrative Office of the Courts.  We look
forward to a busy and exciting 1997.
Mark C. Berger
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Department of Economics
The Center for Business and Economic Research
(CBER) is the applied economic research branch
of the College of Business and Economics at the
University of Kentucky.  Its purpose is to
disseminate economic information and provide
economic and policy analysis to assist decision
makers in Kentucky’s public and private sectors.
In addition, the Center performs research projects
for federal, state, and local government agencies,
as well as for private-sector clients nationwide.
The primary motivation behind CBER’s research
agenda is the belief that systematic and scientific
inquiries into economic phenomena yield
knowledge which is indispensable to the
formulation of informed public policy.
Recent studies completed by CBER focus on the
areas of manpower, labor, and human resources;
health economics; public finance; and economic
growth and development.  In addition to the
Kentucky Annual Economic Report, CBER will
be publishing a quarterly newsletter starting in
1997.  It also publishes the Carol Martin Gatton
College of Business and Economics Working
Papers, which report the results of current
research by college faculty, and Growth and
Change, a scholarly, refereed journal of urban and
regional policy with international distribution.
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Director of the Center for Business and Economic Research since 1994, Dr.
Mark C. Berger is a Professor of Economics and Ashland Oil Research Fellow
at the University of Kentucky.  He received a Ph.D. from The Ohio State
University in 1981, at which time he joined the faculty of the University of
Kentucky.  His research interests include on-the-job training, the structure
of wages, health insurance reform, welfare reform, and other public policy
issues.  His papers have appeared in journals such as the American Economic Review, the
Journal of Political Economy, and the Review of Economics and Statistics.  During spring
1996, he was a visiting professor at the Economics University of Vienna, Austria.
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A u t h o r s
Dr. Dan A. Black is Professor of Economics and Ashland Oil Research
Fellow at the University of Kentucky.  He received his Ph.D. from Purdue
University in 1983, at which time he joined the University of Kentucky.  His
research interests include labor economics and public policy. His papers
have appeared in academic journals such as the American Economic Review,
the Review of Economics and Statistics, and the Journal of Labor Economics.
He is co-author with Dr. Mark Berger of a forthcoming book on on-the-job training from the
Upjohn Institute and is currently evaluating the impact of college quality on earnings with Dr.
Jeff Smith of the University of Western Ontario and Dr. Kermit Daniel of the University of
Pennsylvania’s Wharton School.  During the 1996-97 academic year, Dr. Black is a Visting
Professor of Public Policy at the Heinz School of Public Policy at Carnegie Mellon University.
Dr. Dan A. Black
Amitabh Chandra
Amitabh Chandra is a Research Associate at CBER and a student in the
Ph.D. program in economics at the University of Kentucky.  His research
interests include the economics of higher education, poverty policy, and the
history of economic thought.
Dr. J. Robert Gillette is an Associate Professor of Economics at the University
of Kentucky.  He received his Ph.D. from Texas A&M University in 1986
and joined the faculty of the University of Kentucky in 1994.  Before coming
to Kentucky, he taught at Texas A&M University and Washington State
University, and worked in private consulting.  Dr. Gillette has authored or
co-authored economic studies for various public agencies, including the
Internal Revenue Service and the State of California, and for numerous private organizations.
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Dr. William H. Hoyt is an Associate Professor of Economics at the University
of Kentucky.  In the fall of 1994, he rejoined the faculty of the University of
Kentucky after two years at Georgetown University.  He received his Ph.D.
from the University of Wisconsin in 1986 before coming to the University
of Kentucky.  His areas of interest include tax policy and public finance.
His research has been published in the American Economic Review, the
Journal of Urban Economics, and the Journal of Public Economics.  His study of the Kentucky
tax system was the lead article in the 1995 Kentucky Annual Economic Report.
Dr. William H. Hoyt
Manoj Shanker is an economist with the Commonwealth of Kentucky Office
of Financial Management and Economic Analysis.  He received a bachelor’s
degree in chemical engineering from the Indian Institute of Technology and
a masters degree in economics from Oklahoma State University.  He is also a
member of the National Association of Business Economists.  His principal
work is in the development of econometric models.
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Dr. Eric C. Thompson is the Associate Director of CBER and an Assistant
Professor in the Department of Economics at the University of Kentucky.  He
received his Ph.D. in agricultural economics from the University of Wisconsin-
Madison in 1992.  Dr. Thompson was an Assistant Professor at the Center
for Economic Research at West Virginia University and in the Community
Economic Development Division of the West Virginia University Extension
Service before coming to Kentucky in 1995.  Dr. Thompson’s research fields include local and
state economic development, regional economics, and economic forecasting.  He has published
several research reports and has a paper forthcoming at the Review of Regional Studies.
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Kathleen Toma is a student in the Ph.D. program in economics at the
University of Kentucky.  She received a bachelor’s degree in economics and
East Asian languages and literatures from Indiana University.  Prior to
entering the graduate program, she worked in the private sector for five
years.  Her research interests include international economics and public
economics.  She is currently conducting research on welfare programs.
Kathleen Toma
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Dr. Michael Webb is Chair of the Department of Economics and Professor of
Economics at the University of Kentucky.  He received his Ph.D. in economics
from the University of Illinois in 1980.  Dr. Webb has previously served as
an Associate Dean of the Carol Martin Gatton College of Business and
Economics.  His research interests include trade policy and economic
development.
Dr. Michael Webb
Kentucky’s Per Capita Income: Catching
Up to the Rest of the Country .............................................................. 1
Mark C. Berger
A goal among many leaders in Kentucky is to see the state’s per capita income equal or exceed the
national per capita income average.  Although Kentucky has narrowed the income gap recently, its per
capita income still stands at only 81 percent of the national average.  Matching this national level would
require significant changes in Kentucky.  The state would need large increases in the number of high
school and college graduates in the state, and/or in the percentage of private sector employment per
capita.  Based on previous rates of increase, it will still be many years before Kentucky’s per capita
income is equal to the national average.
T a b l e  o f  C o n t e n t s
Quarterly Forecasts for the
Kentucky Economy, 1997-1999 ............................................................. 9
Eric C. Thompson
The Kentucky economy should see moderate growth in 1997.  Gross state product is forecast to grow 2.4
percent, and total employment and personal income are expected to grow by 1.8 percent and 2.2 percent,
respectively.  The services and retail trade should experience the largest growth among all industries, and
the manufacturing sector is forecast to be a source of major improvement in the Kentucky economy.  The
most rapid occupation growth is forecast for service occupations, with marketing and sales occupations
also showing strong growth.  Professional specialty occupations that require a high level of education are
also expected to grow substantially over the next three years.  Finally, over the next three years, population
in Kentucky is forecast to grow by 0.8 percent annually with the largest increases in older age groups.
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U.S. Economy Performs Relatively Well in 1996 .......................... 23
J. Robert Gillette
During 1996, the U.S. economy saw moderately high growth with low inflation and historically low
unemployment.  Gross domestic product is forecast to have grown 2.8 percent for 1996.  The economy
created approximately 2.5 million additional jobs in 1996, a 2.1 percent increase from 1995 levels.
Inflation again remained low, around 3.0 percent, and the Federal Reserve was reluctant to change
interest rates throughout the year on signs of a slowing economy.  The forecast for 1997 also calls for
moderate growth with low unemployment and low inflation.  Gross domestic product should average just
above 2 percent growth.  Unemployment rates should stay in the mid-5 percent range, and inflation will
again remain low, hovering around 3.0 percent.
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Kentucky General Fund Revenue
Estimates and Accuracy ....................................................................... 19
Manoj Shanker
Providing accurate revenue forecasts is an important part of the budget process for the Commonwealth of
Kentucky.  Kentucky’s process of estimating state revenues comprises models which take into account the
economic environment, including national conditions, in which revenues will be collected.  These models
then provide forecasts for all the major sources of general revenue, including individual income tax,
sales and use tax, corporate income tax, coal severance tax, property tax, and several other revenue
sources.  Since the late 1970s, accurate revenue forecasts have become increasingly important as state
law now requires state funds to be budgeted before they are spent.  For fiscal year 1996, the absolute
percentage error between the estimated and actual revenues was 1.27 percent.
T a b l e  o f  C o n t e n t s
Welfare Reform in Kentucky:
Has “Welfare as We Know It” Changed?........................................ 27
William H. Hoyt and Kathleen Toma
The recently passed welfare reform act will place greater responsibility for welfare programs on states,
changing funding from entitlements to block grants, imposing strict limits on receiving welfare benefits,
and creating work requirements.  Many recipients will likely have difficulty in the transition from welfare
to work.  Many of them have never held a job, and low education levels among recipients will also be a
barrier to work.  Furthermore, some regions in the state will not be able to absorb these former recipients
into the labor market.  The large urban areas of the state will have the best employment opportunities,
and migration out of rural areas may occur as former recipients there may not find work.  The work
participation requirements will also place a burden on the state.  Perhaps the greatest difficulty will be
finding and paying for child care for recipients who must work.
More Efficient Financing of Higher Education
in Kentucky:  The Case for Tuition Increases ............................... 37
Dan A. Black and Amitabh Chandra
A case for the elimination of tuition subsidies at public universities in Kentucky can be made after
studying their impact on equity, efficiency, competition, and the level of educational quality.  We describe
the rationale for determining tuition schedules in Kentucky and demonstrate various inefficient
consequences of the current system.  Insofar as higher education in the state should be subsidized because
certain students are financially constrained, it makes little sense to provide that subsidy to all students
regardless of income levels.  Eliminating the “need-blind” component of this subsidy would be the first
requirement of any response to the current problem of funding.  It would also free up millions of dollars of
revenues that could be returned to taxpayers or used for expenditures in other areas of need.
The Internationalization of the Kentucky Economy .................... 47
Michael Webb
In the 1980s and continuing into the 1990s, Kentucky has seen a growing export boom, driven largely by
automobiles and industrial machinery.  Direct merchandise exports account for about seven percent of
state income.  Including indirect exports, which are Kentucky products processed elsewhere, that number
probably doubles.  In addition, by 1995 foreign-affiliated firms were providing almost 61,000 jobs in
Kentucky.  While manufactured exports have increased, Kentucky agricultural goods and commodities
fell during the first half of the 1990s.  Most of the goods exported from Kentucky went to Canada and East
Asia, which replaced Western Europe as the second most important destination.  Likewise, Canadian and
Japanese firms have been the key new foreign investors in Kentucky from 1991 to 1995, respectively
providing 33 percent and 42 percent of the rise in foreign investment.
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Kentucky’s Per Capita Income: Catching
Up to the Rest of the Country
A goal among many leaders in Kentucky is to see the state’s per capita income equal or
exceed the national per capita income average.  Although Kentucky has narrowed the
income gap recently, its per capita income still stands at only 81 percent of the national
average.  Matching this national level would require significant changes in Kentucky.
The state would need large increases in the number of high school and college graduates
in the state, and/or in the percentage of private sector employment per capita.  Based on
previous rates of increase, it will still be many years before Kentucky’s per capita income
is equal to the national average.
A frequently used indicator of a state’s economic
health is per capita income.  Historically, Kentucky’s
per capita income has been below that of the U.S. average,
although that gap has narrowed in recent years.  In 1995,
per capita income in the U.S. stood at $23,208 in 1995
while in Kentucky the level was $18,849.1  Many believe
that an important goal for Kentucky is to narrow the
gap between its income and that of the rest of the country.
Kentucky Governor Paul Patton, in a recent speech to
the Hopkinsville Chamber of Commerce, said that his
goal was to see per capita income in Kentucky above the
national average.2  Although this may be a lofty goal,
there is cause for optimism given the recent history of
income levels in Kentucky.  Indeed, while per capita
income in Kentucky stood at only 78.3 percent of the
national average in 1985, by 1995 it had increased
steadily to 81.2 percent of the national average.
In this article, I examine long-term trends in
Kentucky’s per capita income relative to the national
average.  In the process, I address several questions:  1)
Has the recent increase in Kentucky’s per capita income
relative to the U.S. average been part of a long-term
increase or has it been confined to more recent years?
2) Has Kentucky’s experience mirrored that of other
states, or has it been unique?  3) What determines
differences in per capita income at the state level?  4)
Can these determinants explain why Kentucky’s per
capita income is below the national average?  5) What
can explain the increase in Kentucky’s per capita income
relative to the national average in recent years?  6) How
different would Kentucky have to be today to be at the
INTRODUCTION national average of per capita income?  7) How long
will it take for Kentucky to reach the national average
per capita income?
PER CAPITA INCOME AS A MEASURE OF
WELL-BEING OR STANDARD OF LIVING
Per capita income is often used by policymakers and
the public as an overall index of well-being or standard
of living in an economy.  Thus, before proceeding with
the analysis, it is important to examine what per capita
income measures and to look at its strengths and
weaknesses as an indicator of economic well-being.
Personal income data are collected by the U.S.
Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Economic
Analysis as part of the National Income and Product
Accounts.  These data comprise wage and salary
disbursements, other labor income, proprietor’s income,
rental income of persons, personal dividend income,
personal interest income, and transfer payments to
persons (e.g., Social Security, Aid to Families with
Dependent Children, etc.).  The majority of personal
income comprises wage and salary disbursements,
followed by transfer payments to persons and personal
interest income.  Table 1 shows the 1995 breakdown of
personal income into its components for the U.S. and
Kentucky.
Thus, personal income is just the total amount of
income earned or disbursed to individuals in the economy
in one form or another in a given year.  Individuals then
use this personal income to purchase goods and services,
pay taxes, or place in savings or investments.  It is thus
a broad-based measure of economic well-being for the
2 CENTER FOR BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC RESEARCH
TABLE 1
Personal Income and Its Components, U.S. and Kentucky, 1995
Kentucky1 U.S.2
Amount Percent Amount Percent
Wage and salary
disbursements 40,644,369 86% 3,423,330 85%
Other labor income 5,476,497 12 423,799 11
Farm proprietors’
income 5,282,519 11 19,529 0
Nonfarm proprietors’
income 623,446 1 449,257 11
Less: contributions
for social insurance -3,650,670 -8 -294,013 -7
Less: adjustment for
residence -250,831 -1 -873 -0.02
Net earnings by place
of residence 47,501,884 65 4,021,029 66
Dividends, interest,
rent 10,879,281 15 1,054,107 17
Transfer payments 14,380,955 20 1,022,841 17
Total personal income 72,762,120 100 6,097,977 100
Population (000s) 3,860 262,755
Per capita income
(dollars) $18,849 $23,208
1 In thousands of dollars unless otherwise noted.
2 In millions of dollars unless otherwise noted.
Source:  U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis,
unpublished data.
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economy.  Per capita personal income is simply the total
personal income divided by the total population, which
gives a per person measure of the income earned or
disbursed to individuals in the economy.  As a result,
per capita income adjusts for population differences over
time or across states.
The chief limitation of personal income as a measure
of well-being is that it does not measure activities or
things that people value that are not traded in the
marketplace.  For example, environmental quality or
other amenities are not reflected in personal income, nor
is the value of leisure time or the value of services
provided inside the household.  Nevertheless, personal
income covers a broad base of economic measures better
than any other indicator.  For instance, another indicator
such as the unemployment rate only gives the percentage
of persons without work, not the well-being of those with
work.  Similarly, the employment rate tells the percentage
of persons that are working but not the earnings of those
workers.  On the other hand, average wages would
provide the earnings of workers but not the income non-
workers have at their disposal.  Consequently, personal
income is the best measure of economic well-being that
is readily available.
PER CAPITA INCOME IN
KENTUCKY RELATIVE TO THE U.S.
Figure 1 shows the ratio of per capita
income in Kentucky to the U.S. average
from 1929 to 1995, the entire time period
for which per capita income data are
available from the National Income and
Product Accounts.  Two series are shown
in Figure 1:  the first spans the period from
1929–94, and the second shows the new
series recently published by the Bureau of
Economic Analysis that covers the period
from 1969–95 but is not comparable to the
earlier series.3
Figure 1 tells an interesting story.  Per
capita income in Kentucky relative to the
U.S. average rose steadily until about 1979
or 1980, exhibiting the long-run
convergence familiar to regional and
growth economists.  For instance, Barro
and Sala-i-Martin argue that marginal
returns to capital may be higher in states
with low income levels, and thus growth
may be higher, promoting convergence.4
Convergence may also occur if there is
mobility of businesses and workers across states.
Businesses will tend to migrate where land and labor
costs are lower, expanding economic activity and raising
per capita income.  In contrast, workers will tend to
migrate where wages are higher, increasing the supply
of workers in certain areas and exerting downward
pressure on income.  The net effect of such mobility would
be an equalizing of incomes across states and higher
rates of growth in per capita income observed in low
income states.5
In the long run, with such mobility of businesses
and workers, incomes would be completely equalized
across states except for differences reflecting location-
specific factors.  Blomquist, Berger, and Hoehn examine
such differences due to location-specific amenities such
as climate, air and water quality, and other natural
conditions.6  For example, if people find Kentucky to be
a pleasant place to live because of its climate or natural
features such as rivers or mountains, then per capita
incomes may remain below the national average; in other
words, Kentucky residents are willing to accept a lower
income to live in a desirable location.  Per capita incomes
in undesirable locations would lie above the national
average to compensate individuals for living in
unpleasant conditions.  Nonetheless, excepting location-
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TABLE 2
Convergence of States’ Per Capita Income to
U.S. Average, 1929–94 and 1985–95
Time Number Average
Period of States Change in
Relative Income
States above U.S.
average, 1929 1929–94 14 -0.1780
States below U.S.
average, 1929 1929–94 34 0.1825
States above U.S.
average, 1985 1985–95 17 0.0004
States below U.S.
average, 1985 1985–95 33 0.0092
Source:  U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of
Economic Analysis, unpublished data.
Kentucky’s Experience
Compared to Other States
specific amenities, both growth theories and regional
models of economic behavior predict an eventual
convergence of per capita income for Kentucky and the
U.S.
Contrary to the long-run pattern of convergence,
however, Kentucky’s relative per capita income fell rather
sharply in the early and middle 1980s.  This fact suggests
that the recession and economic restructuring of that
period affected income in Kentucky more than in the
rest of the country.7  Since about 1985, though,
Kentucky’s per capita income has been rising relative to
the national average, so that the state’s relative income
now stands approximately at its 1979–80 level.  Viewed
in this light, the recent increase in Kentucky’s income
has represented a catching up to a level relative to the
national average that had been reached previously.
What will the future hold and how quickly can we
expect Kentucky’s per capita income to converge to the
national average?  We can get some clues about the
process of convergence by looking at the experiences of
other states.  I turn to this analysis in the next section.
Has this convergence to the national per capita
income average been unique to Kentucky, or has it
occurred in other
states?  Table 2
shows that
convergence has
been proceeding
on a nationwide basis regardless if considering the entire
period of available data (1929–94) or the last 10 years.
This table shows the average change in the ratio of state
to U.S. per capita income, both for those
states that began each time period above
the national average and those that
began below the national average.  As
would be expected from convergence,
the average change for those states above
the average is negative and positive for
those below the average.  States like
Kentucky that are below the national
average are catching up over time and
those above the national average are
falling toward it.  Figure 2 focuses on
the experience of Kentucky and
surrounding states over the last 10 years.
It shows that the pattern of convergence
to the national average has also occurred
in states neighboring Kentucky.
As Kentucky’s relative income
has risen, has its per capita income
ranking among the states changed?
Figure 2 shows that there has been no
change in rankings over the last 10 years
among surrounding states.  Table 3 shows the top 10
and bottom 10 states in per capita income rankings in
1985 and 1995, expressed in terms of income relative to
the U.S. average.  Table 3 shows that even though
convergence to the national average has been occurring,
the state rankings change slowly.  Kentucky was ranked
44th in per capita income in 1985, and after 10 years of
convergence, it had only moved up to 43rd by 1995.
On the most basic level, factors that affect per capita
income are those which
raise or lower the amount of
income a person receives in
a state.  One such set
include factors which raise
What Determines a
State’s Per Capita
Income?
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FIGURE 1
Kentucky Personal Per Capita Income (PCPI)
Relative to U.S. Average, 1929–95
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FIGURE 2
Per Capita Personal Income (PCPI) in Kentucky and Surrounding States Relative to U.S. Average, 1985–95
Top 10 and Bottom 10 States Ranked by
Personal Per Capita Income (PCI) Relative to
U.S. Average, 1985 and 1995
1985 1995
State Relative State Relative
PCI PCI
1 Alaska 1.31 Connecticut 1.37
2 Connecticut 1.28 New Jersey 1.29
3 New Jersey 1.24 Massachusetts 1.21
4 Massachusetts 1.17 New York 1.19
5 New York 1.15 Maryland 1.13
6 California 1.15 Delaware 1.13
7 Maryland 1.14 New Hampshire1.10
8 New Hampshire1.10 Illinois 1.09
9 Delaware 1.07 Hawaii 1.06
10 Illinois 1.06 Nevada 1.05
41 South Dakota 0.80 Idaho 0.81
42 Montana 0.79 Kentucky 0.81
43 Idaho 0.79 North Dakota 0.80
44 Kentucky 0.78 Oklahoma 0.80
45 South Carolina 0.78 Montana 0.79
46 Alabama 0.77 Utah 0.79
47 Utah 0.76 New Mexico 0.78
48 Arkansas 0.76 Arkansas 0.78
49 West Virginia 0.74 West Virginia 0.76
50 Mississippi 0.66 Mississippi 0.72
Source:  U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of
Economic Analysis, unpublished data
TABLE 3
or lower the productivity of the labor force.  Most obvious
among these is the level of education.  Workers in states
with higher levels of education among their residents
will earn more in the labor market and thus increase
those states’ per capita income.  Not only productivity,
but employment of workers in general will be a very
important factor affecting per capita income across states.
States with a higher percentage of their population
working will have more people earning wages and
salaries and thus are likely to have a higher per capita
income.  In addition, whether the state is primarily urban
or rural will have an impact on the model.  Rural states
will have a disproportionate number of individuals
working in agriculture, where wages and incomes will
tend to be lower.  Thus, the very nature of the jobs in
rural states will tend to hold down per capita incomes.
I have constructed an econometric model of per
capita income that explains variation in income across
states in 1995.  After experimenting with several different
combinations of variables which account for the factors
discussed in the previous paragraph, I have specified
five variables that do a good job in explaining differences
in per capita income across states.8  Table 4 shows these
variables and the results of the estimated econometric
model.  This table also shows the average values of the
variables across all the states and the Kentucky values
of the variables which will help explain why Kentucky’s
income is below the national average.
From these econometric estimates, the following
conclusions can be drawn about the determinants of per
capita income across states:  States with higher education
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levels, as measured by the percentages of the population
over age 25 that are high school and college graduates,
have higher per capita incomes.  States with higher
private sector employment per capita also have higher
income per capita.  Interestingly, states with higher
government employment per capita, holding other
variables constant, have lower per capita income.  This
finding suggests that improvements in per capita income
are more likely to be obtained if job growth comes from
the private rather than the public sector.  Finally, as
expected, states with higher rural populations have lower
per capita incomes.
The results of the econometric model can be used to
explain why Kentucky’s per capita income level is below
that of the average across all states.  This is done by
calculating the differences in the predicted per capita
incomes arising from
differences in education
levels, employment per
capita, and the
percentage of population
that is rural between
Kentucky and the U.S.  Figure 3 shows this calculation.
We see that 57 percent of the difference between
Kentucky’s predicted per capita income and the predicted
Kentucky’s Per Capita Income: Catching Up to the Rest of the Country
Econometric Estimates Explaining Per Capita
Income by State, 1995 a
Variable Estimated Kentucky Average
effect b value of states
% of population over 25 &
high school graduate 0.0096 * 31.7 30.9
% of population over 25 &
college graduate 0.0208 * 13.6 20.0
Private sector employment
per capita 0.7679 * 0.4361 0.4860
Public sector employment
per capita -0.4528 0.0832 0.0965
% of population living in
rural areas -0.0039 * 48.1 31.1
Intercept 9.083 * — —
Log of per capita
personal income — 9.844 10.00
a The dependent variable is the natural log of per capita personal income.
Fifty-one observations (including the District of Columbia) were used in
the analysis.  The R2 for the estimated model is 0.7615.
b A * denotes statistical significance at the 5 percent level in a
two-tailed test.
Source:  U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic
Analysis, unpublished data.
TABLE 4 FIGURE 3
Why is Kentucky’s Per
Capita Income Below
the National Average?
average of the states’ per capita incomes is due to
education differences — primarily Kentucky’s low
percentage of college graduates among the population
age 25 and over.  That Kentucky is a much more rural
state than average accounts for 29 percent of the
difference, and the remaining 14 percent comes from
the fact that Kentucky’s employment per capita is lower
than the average of the rest of the states.
Thus, the lion’s share of the difference arises from
the lower education levels in Kentucky compared to the
average of other states.  If education levels were higher,
Kentucky’s per capita income would be closer to the
national average.  In fact, the model suggests that if
Kentucky’s education levels were equal to the national
average, 57 percent of the gap between Kentucky’s per
capita income and the national average per capita income
could be closed.
In considering why Kentucky’s per capita income
has risen relative to the rest of the country from 1985 to
1995, we need to look for trends in Kentucky that are
different from the rest of the country.  Education levels
have been improving over
time both in Kentucky and in
the rest of the country, so
education cannot explain the
rising per capita income in
Kentucky.  Similarly, there has been a small decline in
the percentage of the population living in rural areas in
both Kentucky and the rest of the country.  That leaves
employment/population changes.
While the recession of the early 1980s was
Kentucky’s Per
Capita Income from
1985 to 1995
Explaining the Difference Between Kentucky
and U.S. Per Capita Income, 1995
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Source:  Calculated from results shown in Table 4.
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. . . to have a per capita income
level equal to the national average
at present, Kentucky would need
a far different economy and a
much more educated workforce.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis,
unpublished data.
FIGURE 4
Private Sector Employment Per Capita in
Kentucky and U.S., 1985–95
particularly hard on Kentucky, the opposite was true for
the recession of the early 1990s.  Kentucky barely felt
that recession, and since then, job growth has been
stronger in Kentucky than in many other places.  At the
same time, population growth in Kentucky has not been
as strong as in the rest of the country.  These two factors
combined imply that employment per capita has been
rising faster in Kentucky than in the rest of the country.
Figure 4 shows the changes in private employment per
capita in Kentucky and for the U.S.  From this figure it
is apparent that private employment per capita has been
increasing faster in Kentucky than in the rest of the
country, and this difference may be partially responsible
for the relative gain in Kentucky per capita income from
1985–95.  This employment growth has in part
contributed to the resumption in the convergence of
Kentucky’s per capita income to the U.S. average so that
it is now back to the level it was before the recession of
the late 1970s and early 1980s.
We can use the results of our
econometric model to construct
scenarios under which Kentucky’s
per capita income would be equal
to the U.S. per capita income.  We
must ask how different Kentucky’s
characteristics must be for the
state’s per capita income to be
equal or greater than the U.S.
average.  In Table 5, I consider
three different scenarios that
might accomplish this goal.  The
first scenario increases Kentucky’s
education levels until the
  MAKING THEM EQUAL
TABLE 5
Changes in Kentucky’s Education Levels and Employment Required
for Per Capital Personal Income to be Equal to or Greater than U.S.
Average, 1995
Characteristic Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
% of population 25 and over & high
school graduate + 20% — + 10%
% of population 25 and over &
college graduate + 50% — + 25%
Private sector employment per capita — + 60% + 30%
Source:  Calculated from results shown in Table 4.
predicted per capita income from the model matches the
national average.  Under this scenario, Kentucky would
have the same number of jobs, but its workers would be
more educated and hence more productive, all of which
would raise incomes.  The second scenario increases
private sector employment per capita, increasing the
number of jobs while holding education levels constant.
More jobs might exist because there are more employers
in the state, or labor force participation rates, which are
lower in Kentucky than in most other states, might rise.
In the third scenario both education levels and private
sector employment per capita are raised.  All three
scenarios hold constant the percentage of the population
living in rural areas and the number of government jobs
per capita.
Scenario 1 means Kentucky would have a 50 percent
higher percentage of the population age 25 and over with
a bachelor’s degree or higher and a 20 percent higher
percentage of high school graduates.  Kentucky would
then lie almost exactly at the average of the other states
for the percentage of college graduates (20.4 percent vs.
20.3 percent) and well above the average of the other
states for the percentage of the population that are high
school graduates that did not attend college (38.0 percent
vs. 30.9 percent).  In fact, such a 20 percent increase in
the percentage of the population that are high school
graduates only would place Kentucky ahead of all other
states, including Pennsylvania, where 38.7 percent of
the population age 25 and over are high school graduates.
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Scenario 2 would correspond to a 60 percent increase
in the number of private sector jobs per capita.  This
would put Kentucky far above the average of the other
states.  In fact, only the District of Columbia would have
a higher number of private sector jobs per capita and
many of its jobs are held by commuters who do not live
in the District.
Scenario 3 corresponds to increases in education
levels and private sector employment per capita that are
half the sizes of those in Scenarios 1 and 2.  Such a
combination of characteristics would give Kentucky a
percentage of high school graduates similar to Nebraska
and Vermont, a percentage of college graduates the same
as Wisconsin and Idaho, and a private sector employment
per capita similar to Nevada and Colorado.  In general,
the scenarios show that, to have a per capita income level
equal to the national average at present, Kentucky would
need a far different economy and a much more educated
workforce.
Following the scenarios presented above, Kentucky
would require a long time to catch up to the average
U.S. per capita income.  It might take a generation to
raise education levels as much as needed, and, if
education levels were rising at the same rate in the rest
of the country as well, per capita income in Kentucky
would not rise at all relative to the national average.  On
the other hand, the process of regional convergence,
where capital and labor flow to areas with the highest
return, should naturally raise per capita income in
Kentucky relative to the rest of the country, as it has
done in the past.
How soon should we reasonably expect this
convergence?  Looking at the long-term trends in
Kentucky’s per capita income relative to the U.S. average,
we can see that it took over 30 years to increase
Kentucky’s relative per capita income from
  HOW LONG WILL IT TAKE?
Estimated Rates of Convergence and Number of Years until Kentucky
Per Capita Income Equals U.S. Average Per Capita Income
Time period of Estimated annual Number of years Number of years
estimation convergence rate until equality until 90% of U.S.
reached average reached
1929–94 0.45% 42 20
1929–79 0.60% 31 15
1986–95 0.51% 37 17
Source:  Calculated using U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis
unpublished data.
TABLE 6
approximately 60 percent to 80 percent of the national
average.  To obtain more precise estimates of the rate of
convergence, I have estimated regression models of
Kentucky’s relative per capita income over various time
periods and reported the results in Table 6.  As can be
seen the estimates range from a predicted increase of
0.0045 per year (0.45 percent) over the entire 1929–94
time period of the old series to 0.0060 (0.60 percent) per
year estimated from 1929–79.  These estimates can be
used to predict how long it will take Kentucky to move
from its current level of 81.2 percent of U.S. per capita
income to 100 percent of the U.S. level.  Using the highest
estimated rate of convergence (0.60 percent), Kentucky
will catch up to the national average in 31 years and
will reach 90 percent of the national average in 15 years.
Using any of the three estimates, it is clear that the
convergence of Kentucky’s per capita income to the
national average is a long-run process and difficult to
accomplish overnight.  Even if Kentucky were to increase
the highest estimated long-run rate of convergence by
50 percent, it would still take 21 years for the state to
reach the national average level of per capita income.
Will Kentucky in fact reach this national average?
Probably, given the progression toward convergence that
has been and is still occurring in the U.S.  Of course, if
Kentucky is a desirable place to live and work, it may
never completely reach the national average because
residents will accept lower incomes to live here.  Based
on past trends of convergence, it will take many years
for Kentucky’s per capita income to reach the national
average.  The process could be accelerated, but it would
be difficult.  It would require that education levels or
jobs grow faster than the national average, which may
be difficult for Kentucky to sustain.
CONCLUSION
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
Kentucky’s Per Capita Income: Catching Up to the Rest of the Country
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
8 CENTER FOR BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC RESEARCH
  FOOTNOTES
1 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, “Total
Personal Income and Earnings by Industry (SA05) 1969-1995,”
unpublished data files, September 1996.
2 Governor Paul Patton’s speech to the Hopkinsville Chamber of
Commerce, July 23, 1996.  Source: Office of the Governor Press Office,
September 3, 1996.
3 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, “Total
and Per Capita Personal Income by State and Region,” Survey of Current
Business 76 (May 1996): 94-101.
4 Robert J. Barro and Xavier Sala-i-Martin, “Convergence,” Journal of
Political Economy 100 (April 1992): 223-251.
5 These and other reasons for convergence are discussed in Edward Nissan
and George Carter, “Income Inequality Across Regions Over Time,”
Growth and Change 24 (Summer 1993): 303-320, and Rajiv Mallick,
“Convergence of State Per Capita Incomes: An Examination of Its
Sources,” Growth and Change 24 (Summer 1993): 321-340.
6 Glenn C. Blomquist, Mark C. Berger, and John P. Hoehn, “New Estimates
of Quality of Life in Urban Areas,” American Economic Review 78
(March 1988): 89-107.
7 James S. Fackler, “Economic Overview: National and State Economic
Activity,” Kentucky Annual Economic Report, University of Kentucky
Center for Business and Economic Research (1995): 43-48.
8 I also tried to add other variables to the model, but with the five variables
already included, these variables were not statistically significant.  Most
notable among these were variables measuring the age distribution of
the population, such as the percentage of the population under age 18
and the percentage over age 65.
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income growth rate of 2.3 percent annually.  Growth in
wages, salaries, benefits, and proprietors’ income is
forecast to account for 61.7 percent of all income growth.
Growth in transfer income from sources such as Social
Security and Medicare is forecast to account for only
27.8 percent of total income growth.  Strong employment
and income growth is forecast to encourage net migration
to Kentucky and yield an expected increase in the state’s
population of 0.8 percent per year.
The rate of growth in the Kentucky economy is
forecast to exceed the national growth rate (see the
Appendix for a description of the national forecast).
Kentucky’s growth is expected to exceed national growth
by about one-half of one percent whether the measure is
value-added output, employment, or per capita income.
Faster growth in Kentucky is forecast because the state
is expected to have faster growth in a broad group of
manufacturing, construction, and retail industries.  This
faster growth is occurring even though Kentucky does
not have an large concentration of rapidly growing
national industries, such as those in computers and semi-
conductors.
These faster growth rates forecast for Kentucky can
have enormous consequences.  To give one example,
Kentucky’s total employment growth rate is forecast to
exceed the national rate by 0.5 percent annually on
average.  This percentage difference translates into
26,500 new jobs for Kentucky from 1997 to 1999.
This article describes a forecast for the Kentucky
economy produced using the University of Kentucky
State Econometric Model.  The model, developed in
1995, is used to make quarterly forecasts of the state
economy three years into the future.  The forecasts are
updated each quarter and have significant sector and
demographic detail.  Forecasts are made for many
mining, construction, manufacturing, retail, and service
industries and government at a detailed level.  Forecasts
also are presented for occupational groups.  Population
forecasts are made for five-year age groups for both men
and women.  Forecast results are presented below for 20
manufacturing industries, two mining industries, three
service industries, and three levels of government.
Quarterly forecasts are presented below for 1997, and
annual forecasts are presented for 1997, 1998, and 1999.
As in the previous year, the Kentucky economy is
forecast to experience moderate growth in 1997 through
1999.  While the Kentucky economy is forecast to grow
faster than the national economy throughout the period,
the state is not expected to match the very rapid growth
rates which it experienced in the early 1990s.
Growth in the Kentucky economy is also expected
to be broad-based.  All major industry groups except
mining are expected to add employment from 1997 to
1999.  Twelve of 20 manufacturing industries are
expected to add employment, compared to only 8 of 20
nationally.  All nine occupational groups are forecast to
add jobs over the next three years.
Faster job growth is forecast to lead to wage and
salary income growth of 1.9 percent per year and a total
Quarterly Forecasts for the Kentucky
Economy, 1997 - 1999
Eric C. Thompson
INTRODUCTION
The Kentucky economy should see moderate growth in 1997.  Gross state product is forecast
to grow 2.4 percent, and total employment and personal income are expected to grow by
1.8 percent and 2.2 percent, respectively.  The services and retail trade should experience
the largest growth among all industries, and the manufacturing sector is forecast to be a
source of major improvement in the Kentucky economy.  The most rapid occupation growth
is forecast for service occupations, with marketing and sales occupations also showing
strong growth.  Professional specialty occupations that require a high level of education
are also expected to grow substantially over the next three years.  Finally, over the next
three years, population in Kentucky is forecast to grow by 0.8 percent annually with the
largest increases in older age groups.
THE KENTUCKY FORECAST
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During 1996, the Kentucky economy grew modestly
while the national economy boomed.  Job growth
accelerated in the national economy to 2.9 percent while
in Kentucky, 1996 growth dropped slightly from 1995
levels:  the growth rate for
employment dropped to 1.6 percent,
while the growth rates for real
value-added output and income
both dropped to 2.2 percent.  Even these moderate growth
rates, however, reflected substantial progress for the
Kentucky economy, as in Kentucky’s adding roughly
26,000 jobs in 1996.  These figures are based on
employment data from the first nine months of 1996 and
estimated values for the last three months.
The weaker performance in Kentucky in 1996 in
part reflected a poor year for manufacturing employment.
While the industry grew consistently in the state
throughout the early 1990s, manufacturing employment
in Kentucky declined by 1.3 percent during 1996.
Substantial job loss in the apparel industry was the major
reason for the overall decline in manufacturing
employment.
The performance of the coal mining industry,
however, was more encouraging.  Coal mining
employment remained steady in Kentucky in 1996.  This
is the first time in many years that the industry avoided
significant job loss.
Other major industry groups posted employment
gains in 1996 with the service and retail trade sectors
accounting for the most job growth.  The service industry
grew at 3.5 percent and added 14,000 jobs in 1996.
Business and health services led the way in service
industry growth.  The retail trade industry grew at a rapid
2.1 percent growth rate and added 6,600 jobs.
Most job and income growth also led to modest
population growth.  Population in Kentucky is estimated
to have grown by 0.7 percent in Kentucky during 1996.1
Reflecting moderate population and income growth, real
per capita income in Kentucky grew by 1.6 percent.
Recent
Developments
The Next Year
The forecast for 1997 predicts a faster rate of growth
for Kentucky than the United States.  This is true for a
range of measures, from real value-added output, real
personal income, total
employment, and manufacturing
employment.  While Kentucky did
not share in the rapid economic growth of the last year,
the rate of growth in the Kentucky economy is forecast
to grow while declining modestly across the nation (see
Appendix for a description of the national economic
forecast).
Real value-added output, or real gross state product,
is forecast to grow at a moderate 2.4 percent rate in 1997,
up slightly from 2.2 percent growth in 1996.  Growth is
forecast to be steady and above 2.0 percent throughout
1997.  As Figure 1 shows, the slowest growth is forecast
for the fourth quarter.  Gross state product is forecast to
grow at 2.4 percent in each of the first two quarters before
rising to 2.6 percent in the third quarter and dipping to
2.0 percent in the fourth quarter.  All in all, 1997 will be
a year for steady, moderate growth in Kentucky.
Such steady growth is also evident in employment
forecasts.  Total employment growth is forecast to reach
2.0 percent in the first quarter of 1997, 1.8 percent in
the second and third quarters, and 1.7 percent in the
fourth quarter.  While it is somewhat more volatile,
growth in real total personal income also is forecast to
be steady.  Total personal income growth is forecast to
reach 2.8 percent in the first quarter, 2.3 percent in the
second quarter, 2.2 percent in the third quarter, and 1.7
percent in the fourth quarter.  With steady employment
and income growth, population growth is also expected
to remain moderate in Kentucky in 1997, with an increase
of 30,500 during the year, representing a 0.8 percent
growth rate.
FIGURE 1
1997 Kentucky Gross State Product Growth
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The forecast for 1997 predicts a
faster rate of growth for Kentucky
than the United States.  This is true
for a range of measures, from real
value-added output, real personal
income, total employment, and
manufacturing employment.
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Just as in previous years, the largest growth among
industries in 1997 is forecast for services and retail trade.
Service industry employment is forecast to grow by 2.8
percent in 1997, adding a total of 11,500 jobs.  Business
services, growing at 5.4 percent, and health services,
growing at 2.8 percent, are forecast to add the most new
services jobs.  Retail trade employment is forecast to grow
at 1.9 percent in 1997, adding 6,400 new jobs.
The manufacturing industry is expected to be a
source of major improvement in the Kentucky economy
in 1997.  After declining in 1996, manufacturing
employment is forecast to rise by 0.5 percent in Kentucky
in 1997.  This translates into 1,600 new manufacturing
jobs.  Printing, wood products, paper products, and
fabricated metals are forecast to be the strongest
manufacturing industries in 1997.
Continuing a trend from 1996, the coal mining
industry is forecast to perform fairly well in Kentucky in
1997.  Employment is expected to remain unchanged
during the year, expanding slightly in the beginning of
the year before falling again in the second half of 1997.
Unfortunately, that decline is forecast to continue through
1998 and 1999.
Growth in the Kentucky economy is forecast to
accelerate in 1998 and 1999.  Increased growth in those
two years is forecast to lead to strong growth overall for
the three-year period.  Real gross state product is forecast
to grow nearly 3.1 percent on average for the three years.
Total employment is forecast to average 2.0 percent per
year, and real total personal income is forecast to grow
by 2.3 percent on average.  Each of these growth rates
exceeds national forecasts by roughly one-half of one
percent.  Population growth in Kentucky is expected to
lag national growth by 0.1 percent.  The following three
sections discuss the growth of industries, income, and
population in more detail.
Gross state product (GSP), the measure of value-
added output, is a comprehensive measure of economic
activity which includes capital consumption, profits,
business tax payments as well as employment and
earnings.  As a result,
analysis of gross state
product can sometimes lead
to a different perspective
than analysis of a less comprehensive measure, such as
employment growth.  In particular, while more rapid
job growth in the services industry is indicative of the
emerging service economy, analysis of gross state product
data reiterates the crucial role which manufacturing and
other goods-producing industries play in the overall
economy.
Manufacturing and other goods-producing
industries (such as agriculture, mining, and construction)
continue to account for a substantial share of gross state
product.  Manufacturing accounted for 26.8 percent of
real gross state product in 1996, while goods-producing
industries as a whole accounted for 37.2 percent.  The
remaining 62.8 percent of real gross state product was
divided among other industries, with retail and wholesale
trade accounting for 14.6 percent, services 13.5 percent,
finance, insurance and real estate 12.9 percent,
government 11.9 percent, and transportation,
communications, and public utilities 10.0 percent.
Manufacturing and other goods-producing
industries are forecast to account for an even larger share
of job growth, portending an even more important role
in the economy in the future.  As Figure 2 shows,
manufacturing is forecast to account for 40.1 percent of
growth in real gross state product from 1997 through
1999.  All goods-producing industries are forecast to
account for 46.3 percent of real gross state product
growth, nearly half of the total.  Growth in
manufacturing, mining, agriculture, and construction
will be a crucial engine for growth in the Kentucky
economy in years to come.
Figure 2 also shows the relative significance of trade
and services for growth in real gross state product.  These
industries are forecast to play a significant but secondary
role in GSP growth.  Retail and wholesale trade are
forecast to account for 15.1 percent of real gross state
product growth from 1997 through 1999, while services
are forecast to account for 13.8 percent of growth.
Strong growth in real gross state product is
consistent with growing employment.  An increase in
real GSP, however, does not guarantee that employment
also will increase. Productivity, or real GSP per worker,
Gross State Product
and Employment
THE THREE YEAR FORECAST
Share of 1997 to 1999 Gross State Product
Growth in Selected Industry Groups
FIGURE 2
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can grow rapidly enough in some industries so that total
employment will decline even as gross state product
grows.  This trend is occurring nationally in many
manufacturing, mining, and construction industries.
Figure 3 shows indices for employment in 1997 through
1999 compared to employment in the fourth quarter of
1996.  As depicted, goods-producing employment is
forecast to decline in the U. S. from the fourth quarter of
1996 through the fourth quarter of 1999.
Growth in real GSP in goods-producing industries,
however, is leading to an increase in employment in
Kentucky.  As shown in Figure 3, employment in goods-
producing industries is forecast to increase steadily
throughout the three-year period.  Goods-producing
industries are forecast to grow by 1.1 percent per year
on average.
Non-goods-producing industries also are forecast to
grow more quickly in Kentucky than nationally.  Figure
3 shows growth indices for non-goods-producing
industries like services, retail trade, wholesale trade, and
government in Kentucky and the U.S.  Non-goods-
producing industries in Kentucky consistently outperform
the national averages.  The growth rate in Kentucky is
forecast to be 2.4 percent compared to a 2.0 percent for
the U.S.
Income growth in Kentucky is forecast to exceed
national growth in each of the next three years.  Figure
4 shows indices of real total personal income in Kentucky
and the U.S.  Real income refers to income
adjusted for inflation.  Growth in real total
income in Kentucky is forecast on average
to be 0.4 percent greater each year than national income
growth.  As with employment and gross state product,
the growth rate of total real personal income is forecast
to accelerate over the three-year period.  Growth in 1997
Indices of Employment Forecasts for Goods- and Non-goods-Producing Industries
FIGURE 3
Income
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Indices of Real Personal Income Forecasts for Kentucky and the United States
FIGURE 4
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is forecast at 2.2 percent, but is forecast at 2.4% in 1998
and 1999.
Faster total income growth in Kentucky is not the
result of faster population growth in the state. In fact,
population in Kentucky is forecast to grow slightly slower
than nationally over the three-year period.  Instead, faster
income growth in Kentucky is the result of faster income
growth per person.  Growth in real per capita, or per
person, income in Kentucky is forecast to average 1.5
percent in Kentucky compared to an average growth of
1.0 percent nationally.  Kentucky’s more rapid expansion
is forecast to result in faster-rising average incomes for
residents.
Population growth in Kentucky has been steady
throughout the 1990s.2  Rising in-migration, reduced out-
migration, or both, have lead to a strong, positive net
migration, which is the number of persons migrating to
Kentucky minus the number migrating
out of the state. With more persons
moving to the state than leaving it,
population growth has exhibited the kind of steady
growth seen elsewhere in the nation (net migration also
is positive for the nation as a whole).  From 1997 to
1999, Kentucky’s population is forecast to grow by 0.8
percent annually compared to 0.9 percent for the nation.
This figure translates into an average increase of 31,200
residents each year.  Of that total, 23,300 are due to net
migration.
This strong growth, however, is not forecast in all
population groups.  As nationally, Kentucky’s forecast
shows an aging population.  The number of persons age
30–39 in Kentucky is forecast to decline slightly over
the next three years, and growth is very modest in other
younger age groups.  At the same time, some older age
groups should grow
rapidly.  In particular,
population is forecast to
grow quickly among the
older portions of the
labor force.  The
population of persons
age 50–59 is expected to
grow by 3.6 percent per
year from 1997 through
1999.  Population is also
forecast to grow quickly
among the oldest
portion of the
population.  The
number of persons over
age 85 should grow by
5.4 percent per year
over the next three
years.
The strong growth forecast for the Kentucky
economy is not the result of a consistent growth rate
among all industries, sources of income, or population
age groups.  Many industries are growing much more
rapidly than total employment, while some
manufacturing and mining industries are not growing
at all.  The following sections examine growth in
industries, occupations, sources of income, and
population.
The strong employment picture in Kentucky is the
result of broad-based growth.  As
nationally, the majority of job growth
is forecast in retail trade and
services.  But, in Kentucky, nearly all industries are
forecast to add employment over the next three years
with only a few industries forecast to shed employment.
These exceptions are coal mining, selected
manufacturing industries, and federal government
employment.  Even coal mining employment, however,
is forecast to hold steady in 1997, before falling in 1998
and 1999.
Manufacturing employment is forecast to grow at
an average annual rate of 1.0 percent in Kentucky from
1997 through 1999.  This growth rate compares very
favorably with the forecast of a decline of 0.5 percent in
manufacturing employment nationally.  Manufacturing
employment is forecast to increase by 0.5 percent in 1997,
1.3 percent in 1998, and 1.4 percent in 1999.  These
growth rates translate into an average increase of 3,300
TABLE 1
Real Gross State Product (GSP) by Major Industry Group, Seasonally Adjusted
1996 1997 quarterly growth Annual Annual averages
GSP ($mil) (at an annual rate) (%) growth (%) Growth Growth
Industry 4th Q 1st Q 2nd Q 3rd Q 4th Q 1997 1998 1999 ($mil) rate (%)
Total 69,416.8 2.4 2.4 2.6 2.0 2.4 3.3 3.6 2,200.2 3.1
Agriculture 1,638.7 -9.7 -10.3 11.3 -15.4 -6.5 6.4 5.0 24.4 1.6
Mining 2,611.7 5.1 7.2 3.0 3.4 4.7 2.0 2.1 78.4 2.9
Construction 3,022.5 1.3 0.7 0.6 0.0 0.6 1.2 1.5 34.7 1.1
Manufacturing 18,549.9 1.9 3.2 2.1 2.7 2.5 5.1 6.1 881.8 4.6
TCPU 6,888.1 2.9 2.9 3.0 2.9 2.9 3.0 3.1 213.3 3.0
Trade 10,222.9 3.5 2.5 3.1 2.9 3.0 3.3 3.2 332.3 3.2
FIRE 8,995.0 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.8 161.5 1.8
Services 9,415.0 3.3 3.1 3.1 2.9 3.1 3.1 3.1 302.7 3.1
Government 8,073.1 3.7 1.9 2.2 1.9 2.4 1.9 1.9 170.9 2.1
Note: TCPU = Transportation, Communications, and Public Utilities
FIRE = Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate
Population
FORECAST DETAIL
Employment
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TABLE 2
Growth and Growth Rates for Nonfarm Employment by Industry, Seasonally Adjusted
1996 employ- 1997 quarterly growth Growth
 ment (thou) (at an annual rate) (%) Annual growth (%) Growth rates (%)
4th Q 1stQ 2nd Q 3rd Q 4th Q 1997 1998 1999 Ky. Ky. U.S.
Total nonfarm 1,680.97 1.97 1.81 1.84 1.71 1.83 2.10 2.20 35.09 2.05 1.54
Goods-producing 409.42 0.43 1.22 0.71 0.52 0.72 1.01 1.51 4.47 1.08 -0.18
Mining 24.30 1.84 2.57 -1.45 -1.48 0.35 -2.46 -2.21 -0.35 -1.44 -1.65
Coal mining 20.43 2.48 3.36 -1.35 -1.50 0.73 -2.87 -2.69 -0.33 -1.61 NA
Construction 74.96 1.08 3.24 0.44 2.02 1.69 1.12 3.23 1.54 2.02 1.12
Manufacturing 310.17 0.17 0.62 0.94 0.32 0.51 1.25 1.37 3.28 1.05 -0.53
Food products 22.73 -3.06 -0.64 0.84 0.00 -0.73 -0.59 1.32 -0.00 -0.00 0.16
Tobacco 4.34 1.37 -2.44 -3.46 -4.82 -2.36 -4.55 -5.02 -0.17 -3.98 -1.69
Textiles 8.91 -0.47 3.16 5.46 4.83 3.22 2.82 1.98 0.24 2.67 1.39
Apparel 26.65 0.58 2.51 1.76 1.53 1.59 0.61 0.94 0.28 1.04 0.21
Wood 14.24 8.61 5.11 2.68 1.95 4.55 2.56 2.01 0.45 3.04 0.30
Furniture 5.06 -3.66 -2.45 -1.09 0.95 -1.58 5.03 8.62 0.21 4.02 -0.20
Paper products 10.99 6.90 6.26 6.05 4.84 6.01 4.64 4.38 0.58 5.01 0.58
Printing and
 publishing 22.03 -0.06 1.27 2.52 1.90 1.40 2.05 2.21 0.42 1.89 0.48
Chemicals 14.47 0.14 1.48 2.35 1.51 1.37 0.51 -0.52 0.07 0.45 0.07
Petroleum and
coal refining 3.50 5.38 3.56 2.18 1.45 3.14 0.47 -0.42 0.04 1.06 -0.96
Rubber and
plastic products 19.72 7.84 6.52 2.08 1.37 4.42 2.65 2.60 0.66 3.22 0.51
Leather products 1.25 -6.36 0.81 -1.78 -4.92 -3.10 -4.16 -4.79 -0.05 -4.02 -8.83
Stone, clay, and
glass products 11.40 -1.33 1.52 1.48 -1.33 0.08 -0.65 -0.88 -0.06 -0.48 -1.07
Primary metals 17.24 -0.00 -0.75 -0.31 -0.52 -0.40 1.31 1.01 0.11 0.64 -0.38
Fabricated metals 22.48 2.52 2.44 2.17 2.00 2.28 1.97 1.72 0.46 1.99 0.25
Non-electric
machinery 37.00 -4.21 -4.52 -1.12 -0.45 -2.59 0.33 1.20 -0.13 -0.35 -1.55
Electric machinery 25.90 -2.31 -2.63 -2.86 -2.88 -2.67 -2.30 -1.46 -0.54 -2.14 -1.62
Transportation
 equipment 33.18 -3.12 -2.89 2.46 1.35 -0.58 4.34 3.19 0.78 2.32 -1.42
Instruments and
related products 4.06 -0.75 1.27 -0.46 -1.75 -0.43 -2.65 -0.74 -0.05 -1.27 -2.82
Miscellaneous
manufacturing 5.02 11.44 15.10-12.08 -19.62 -2.42 2.59 -0.58 -0.00 -0.14 -1.92
Non-goods-producing 1,271.54 2.47 2.00 2.21 2.09 2.19 2.44 2.42 30.62 2.35 1.96
TCPU 93.13 1.37 1.24 1.48 1.36 1.36 1.53 1.58 1.41 1.49 0.93
Trade 407.73 2.29 1.81 2.04 1.72 1.96 2.39 2.19 9.08 2.18 1.48
Wholesale trade 81.15 2.54 1.61 2.25 1.71 2.03 2.42 2.19 1.84 2.21 1.67
Retail trade 326.58 2.22 1.86 1.99 1.72 1.95 2.38 2.19 7.24 2.17 1.42
FIRE 66.45 0.21 -0.22 0.74 0.40 0.28 0.81 1.11 0.49 0.73 0.92
Services 411.17 2.61 2.76 2.80 2.99 2.79 3.30 3.33 13.32 3.14 3.08
Business services 75.96 5.29 5.47 5.28 5.66 5.43 5.88 5.47 4.49 5.59 NA
Health services 146.16 3.06 2.80 2.72 2.77 2.84 3.05 3.18 4.55 3.02 2.94
Government 293.06 3.41 1.95 2.17 1.95 2.37 1.96 2.01 6.32 2.11 1.35
Federal 39.75 -1.19 -2.10 -1.85 -1.21 -1.59 -1.23 -0.45 -0.43 -1.09 -1.55
State and local 253.31 4.14 2.58 2.80 2.44 2.99 2.44 2.37 6.75 2.60 1.81
State 87.93 3.59 1.89 1.33 1.37 2.04 0.95 0.90 1.15 1.30 NA
Local 165.38 4.44 2.95 3.58 3.00 3.49 3.22 3.12 5.60 3.28 NA
Note: TCPU = Transportation, Communications, and Public Utilities
FIRE = Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate
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Quarterly Forecasts for the Kentucky Economy, 1997 - 1999
jobs for each year from 1997 to 1999.
The broad-based growth evident throughout
Kentucky’s economy is also forecast for the
manufacturing industry.  This broad-based growth is seen
in Table 2.  Twelve of the 20 manufacturing industries
in Kentucky are forecast to add jobs from 1997 though
1999.  This compares with only eight manufacturing
industries which are expected to grow nationally.  The
fastest rates of growth are forecast for plastics, wood
products, transportation equipment, and fabricated
metals.  The fastest rates of decline are forecast for
tobacco products, leather products, and electric
machinery.
The increase in manufacturing is also forecast for
the construction industry, which is forecast to grow by
2.0 percent per year compared to 1.1 percent per year
annually.  Growth is forecast to be fastest in 1999.  After
holding steady in 1997, coal mining is forecast to remain
one declining part of the Kentucky economy in 1998
and 1999, although this rate of decline is expected to be
minimal.  After declining by 1,400 jobs per year in the
early 1990s, coal mining employment is forecast to
decline by only 500 jobs per year in 1998 and 1999.
The faster growth forecast for Kentucky in goods-
producing industries such as manufacturing and
construction also is forecast for many non-goods-
producing industries such as retail and services.  This
result is not surprising given the 0.5 percent faster rate
of income growth expected for Kentucky than nationally.
Since demand for industries such as retail and services
is largely driven by local demand and incomes, faster
growing incomes in Kentucky should lead all services
and trade industries to grow significantly faster in
Kentucky than nationally.  This faster rate of growth is
clearly seen in retail employment and government
employment and to a lesser extent in services
employment.  Retail trade employment is forecast to grow
by 2.2 percent in Kentucky compared to 1.5 percent
nationally over the next three years.  Similarly, wholesale
trade employment is forecast to grow by 2.2 percent in
Kentucky compared to 1.6 percent nationally.  In part
Twelve of the 20 manufacturing
industries in Kentucky are forecast
to add jobs from 1997 through
1999. . . . The fastest rates of
growth are forecast for plastics,
wood products, transportation
equipment, and fabricated metals.
reflecting continued efforts at improving education in
Kentucky, state and local government in Kentucky is
forecast to grow by 2.6 percent per year compared to 1.8
percent nationally.  Moreover, as part of continued efforts
to cut the federal budget deficit, federal government
employment is forecast to decline in both Kentucky and
the nation.
Despite the much more rapid growth in trade and
government, some non-goods-producing industries only
are forecast to grow slightly more quickly in Kentucky
than nationally.  In particular, health services and other
types of services are forecast to only grow about 0.1
percent faster in Kentucky than nationally from 1997
through 1999.  Finance, insurance, and real estate are
forecast to grow 0.1 percent slower in Kentucky than
nationally during the period.
The rate of services growth, however, still is forecast
to exceed the rate of growth in retail employment in
Kentucky.  The services industry still contains some of
the fastest growing portions of the economy, such as
business services and professional services.  A trend
among many businesses towards outsourcing services
rather than keeping in-house staff continues to fuel rapid
growth in business and professional services.  Table 2
indicates that business services are forecast to grow by
5.6 percent per year on average in 1997 through 1999.
It is also worth noting that the rate of health care
employment growth has moderated both in Kentucky
and nationally.  With efforts to reduce the rate of growth
in health care costs, health care employment in Kentucky
is forecast to grow at 3.0 percent annually — still a fast
rate of growth but below the average growth rate for
services.
In summary, most trade and service industries are
forecast to grow faster in Kentucky than nationally.  This
is consistent with the faster rates of income growth in
the state.  The state also is forecast to benefit from a
faster growing manufacturing sector relative to the U.S.,
although the number of new jobs in manufacturing is
expected to be substantially less than the number in
services or retail trade.
This pattern of industry growth also is evident in
the pattern of occupational growth. As Table 3 indicates,
the most rapid job growth is forecast to occur in services,
and to a lesser extent, marketing and sales occupations.
Workers in services occupations
include health care assistants, food
preparers, cleaners, and household
workers.  Marketing and sales occupations are composed
primarily of cashiers and other retail sales workers.
Nearly 8,000 services jobs are forecast to be gained over
each of the next three years, while 4,700 marketing and
sales jobs are forecast to be gained.  These numbers
Occupations
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translate into a 2.8 percent annual growth rate for service
occupation jobs and a 2.6 percent annual growth rate for
marketing and sales jobs.  Both growth rates are well
above the forecast overall growth rate of 2.0 percent for
all occupations.  Slower growth is forecast for those
occupations which account for a substantial share of
manufacturing employment, such as precision,
production, craft, and repair workers, and operators,
fabricators, and laborers.  The growth rate for both of
these groups is forecast to be 1.5 percent.  A substantial
share of the job growth in these occupations is forecast
to occur for workers performing tasks in non-
manufacturing industries such as construction and
transportation, communications, and public utilities.
Another pattern is the growth for occupations
requiring a high level of education.  Among all
occupational groups, workers in professional specialty
occupations have the highest level of education.  This
occupational group also has the highest growth rate and
is forecast to experience the second largest job increase
in the next three years.  The number of workers in
TABLE 4
Growth Rates for Real Personal Income by Source, Seasonally Adjusted
1996 Annual averages
income 1997 quarterly growth Annual growth Gr owth Growth
($mil) (at an annual rate)  (%) rate (%) ($mil) rate (%)
4th Q 1st Q 2nd Q 3rd Q 4th Q 1997 1998 1999 Ky. Ky. U.S.
Total personal income 48,829.4 2.8 2.3 2.2 1.7 2.2 2.4 2.4 1,166.1 2.3 1.9
Wage and salary income 27,058.8 1.7 1.8 1.9 0.8 1.6 2.2 2.0 528.7 1.9 1.4
Other labor income (benefits) 3,454.2 3.8 4.3 3.0 2.1 3.3 4.1 4.6 144.3 4.0 3.1
Proprietor’s income 3,582.9 2.1 1.4 1.2 0.7 1.3 1.0 0.7 37.0 1.0 -0.4
Residential adjustment -151.4 9.6 13.1 10.9 10.2 10.9 11.2 11.1 -18.7 11.1 NA
Contributions to
social insurance 2,202.5 3.4 2.8 2.4 1.3 2.5 2.5 2.1 53.7 2.4 1.9
Transfer income 9,576.8 6.9 3.0 2.3 3.6 3.9 2.9 3.0 324.2 3.3 3.1
Dividends, interest, rent 6,753.4 2.1 3.5 3.8 3.1 3.1 2.8 3.0 207.2 3.0 2.9
Per capita income 12,542.1 2.1 1.5 1.3 0.8 1.4 1.6 1.5 0.2 1.5 1.0
TABLE 3
Growth and Growth Rates for Employment by Occupation,
Seasonally Adjusted, 1996–99
1996 1999 Annual Annual
4th Q 4th Q growth growth (%)
Total 1,681,004 1,786,268 35,088 2.0%
Executives, administrators, and managers 168,523 180,243 3,907 2.3
Professional specialty 203,703 223,231 6,509 3.1
Technicians and related support 59,510 63,570 1,353 2.2
Marking and sales 177,982 192,057 4,692 2.6
Administrative support, including clerical 318,947 329,578 3,544 1.1
Service 267,294 290,668 7,791 2.8
Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and related 17,020 17,911 297 1.7
Precision production, craft, and repair 202,077 211,061 2,995 1.5
Operators, fabricators, and laborers 265,948 277,949 4,000 1.5
professional specialty occupations is
forecast to grow by 3.1 percent
annually, resulting in a net increase
of 6,500 workers each year. The
professional specialty occupational
group includes teachers, scientists,
engineers, doctors, and artists, among
others.  Executives, administrators,
and managers as well as technicians
are another group of workers which
have a higher level of education on
average.
The annual rate of job growth in
these two occupational groups is
forecast to be 2.2 percent, above the
average of 2.0 percent for all
occupations.  The rapid growth rate
for these education-oriented occupations is forecast to
occur throughout the economy, rather than being tied to
a particular industry.
Despite these differences among particular
occupations, it is worth noting that the outlook for job
growth is at least fair for all of these nine aggregate
occupation categories.  Jobs in each of the nine
occupations is forecast to grow over the next three years,
and the growth rate is forecast to exceed at least 1.0
percent per year in all occupational groups.  These
numbers point to expanding opportunities for most
Kentucky workers.  While the number of jobs may be
declining in some more specific occupations, these
aggregate numbers indicate that there at least should be
jobs available in related occupations.
Real total personal income is forecast to grow more
rapidly in Kentucky than nationally.  Table 4 shows the
sources of income growth and indicates that
this faster overall growth results from faster
growth in earnings from work, such as wages
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and salaries, benefits (other labor income), and
proprietors’ income.
Real wage and salary earnings is forecast to grow
by 1.9 percent per year in Kentucky compared with 1.4
percent nationally.  This 1.9 percent rate of growth
translates into nearly $539 million of real income growth
per year from 1997 to 1999.  Benefits income (other labor
income) is forecast to grow by 4.0 percent per year in
Kentucky compared to 3.1 percent nationally.  This 4.0
percent increase is forecast to yield over $144 million in
new income each year.  Proprietors’ income, forecast to
decline nationally, is forecast to grow by 1.0 percent per
year in Kentucky from 1997 to 1999, adding $37 million
per year to state income.  Together, these three sources
of working income are forecast to account for $720
million of $1,166 million of income growth per year in
Kentucky.  Earnings from work will be the key source
for income growth in Kentucky, accounting for  61.7
percent of income growth in the state.
Income from transfer payments and dividend,
interest, and rent income will be the other main sources
of income growth for the state.  Growth in these sources
of income is forecast to mirror national growth.  This is
not surprising since growth in transfer income and
dividend, interest, and rent income tends to follow growth
in population, and population growth in Kentucky is
forecast roughly to equal population growth nationally.
Growth in transfer income is forecast to grow by 3.3
percent per year in Kentucky compared to 3.1 percent
per year nationally, while growth in dividend, interest,
and rent income in Kentucky is forecast to grow by 3.0
percent compared to 2.9 percent nationally.
Growth in transfer income is forecast to account for
$324 million per year from 1997 through 1999, and
growth in dividend, interest, and rent income is forecast
to grow by $207 million per year.  It is worth noting that
transfer income is forecast to account for 27.8 percent of
total income growth.  Despite legitimate concerns about
the rapid growth of transfer income, it is important to
stress that earnings from work is forecast to account for
a much larger share of income growth in Kentucky than
transfer payment income.
Another interesting pattern is the decline of
Kentucky’s residential adjustment, which is the
difference between what Kentuckians earn working in
other states minus what residents of other states earn
working in Kentucky.  The decline in residential
adjustment indicates that one result of Kentucky’s
forecast employment growth is expected to be an increase
in workers from nearby states finding work in Kentucky,
a decrease in the number of Kentuckians working in
nearby states, or both.
RISKS TO THE FORECAST
The forecast presented for the Kentucky economy
is based in part on the baseline September forecast for
the U.S. economy produced by DRI/McGraw Hill.  This
baseline national forecast represents a moderate, most
likely scenario for the economy over the next three years.
Use of this moderate national forecast implies that the
Kentucky forecast is also a moderate forecast, one
scenario among a group of possible scenarios for the
state’s economy.  The national economy has other
potential outcomes, which in turn could be played out in
the Kentucky economy.  The three alternative national
scenarios are examined below.
In the first alternative scenario, there may be a
recession on the horizon for 1998.  With the economy
currently at below the full employment rate, inflation
pressures in the economy may build over 1997.  In turn,
rising inflation could cause the Federal Reserve to raise
interest rates substantially.  In this scenario, rising
interest rates would lead to a recession in 1998.  DRI
has assigned a probability of 20 percent to this scenario.
In the second alternative scenario, a recession occurs
in 1997.  This would occur due to a collapse in consumer
confidence because of some unexpected event, such as
an international incident.  DRI has assigned a probability
of only 10 percent to this scenario.
In the third alternative scenario, national growth
could continue at its more rapid pace of the last year.  In
this scenario, the capacity of the economy grows more
quickly than expected due to quickly rising productivity
and faster than expected growth in the size of the labor
force.  Greater national capacity means that faster growth
can be achieved without sparking a rise in inflation and
without prompting the Federal Reserve to lower the rate
of growth in the economy.  DRI has also assigned a
probability of only 10 percent to this scenario.
The Kentucky economy is forecast to experience
moderate growth during 1997, 1998, and 1999.  Growth
is expected to accelerate throughout the period, with the
most rapid growth occurring in 1999.  Growth is also
forecast to be broad-based:  most industries are forecast
to add employment, with the exception of coal mining,
several manufacturing industries, and the federal
government.  All major occupational groups are forecast
to add employment.  Moreover, real income and
population are each forecast to grow at a moderate rate.
Moderate growth also is forecast to help Kentucky
maintain already low statewide unemployment rates.
The services and retail trade industries are forecast
to add the most new jobs during the next three years.
Together, these two industries are forecast to add 20,500
CONCLUSION
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of the 35,100 net new jobs expected in the Kentucky
economy each year.  The manufacturing industry as a
whole is forecast to add 3,300 new jobs per year from
1997 to 1999.  Yet, despite this relatively low share of
employment growth, manufacturing remains a key to
growth in the state economy as the manufacturing sector
is forecast to account for 40.1 percent of growth in real
gross state product in Kentucky.  It is also worth noting
that, despite the growing importance of transfer payments
to the Kentucky economy, the wage, salary, and benefits
returns from working are forecast to be the primary source
of income growth in Kentucky during the next three
years.
Growth in the Kentucky economy is forecast to
exceed growth in the national economy for most
employment and income measures.  Manufacturing
employment is forecast to grow in Kentucky from 1997
to 1999, while it declines nationally.  Growth rates in
Kentucky for retail trade, wholesale trade, government,
and to a lesser extent, services employment, are forecast
to exceed growth rates for the U.S.  Similarly, growth
rates for wages and salaries, benefits, and proprietor’s
income in Kentucky are forecast to exceed those for the
U.S.  Population growth in Kentucky, however, is forecast
roughly to equal national growth rates.
1 Personal income data for Kentucky are not yet available for the last
three quarters of 1996.  Population data are yet not available for the
entire year.  Thus, income and population values needed to be forecast
for these 1996 quarters are based on the Kentucky employment data
which are available and national values for income growth.  Kentucky
employment growth and unemployment data are key inputs into forecasts
of the migration component of population and the wage and salary
benefits, and proprietor’s income components of personal income.
2 Moderate series birth and survival rates were taken from Michael Price,
Thomas Sawyer, and Martye Scobee, How Many Kentuckians:
Population Forecast 1995-2020, Population Research, Kentucky State
Data Center, University of Louisville, 1993.
3 National industrial production and productivity by industry are variables
in manufacturing and mining, gross state product, and employment
equations.  National consumer spending and industry employment
variables are important inputs for retail and service equations.  National
data on income growth by source are key variables in income growth
equations.
  FOOTNOTES
APPENDIX: NATIONAL FORECAST
Quarterly Forecasts for the Kentucky Economy, 1997 - 1999
The forecast for Kentucky is based on a baseline
national forecast from the DRI/McGraw-Hill publication
Review of the U.S. Economy for September 1996.
National variables forecast by DRI/McGraw-Hill are key
variables in nearly every part of the University of
Kentucky State Econometric Model.3
The baseline national forecast from DRI/McGraw-
Hill depicts an economy in 1997, 1998, and 1999 that
slows relative to the rapid growth of early 1996, but which
continues to experience moderate growth.  The national
economy is forecast to experience slow growth in the
first two quarters of 1997 with growth accelerating to a
more moderate pace in the second half of 1997 and into
1998 and 1999.  Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
growth is forecast to see a 1.6 percent annual growth
rate in the first two quarters of 1997 and a 2.2 percent
growth rate for the entire year.  Real GDP is forecast to
grow by 2.3 percent in 1998 and 2.2 percent in 1999.
On an annual basis, growth rates are very similar for
1997, 1998, and 1999.  This similarity is also seen for
employment and unemployment:  employment is forecast
to grow by 1.7 percent nationally in 1997, 1.5 percent in
1998, and 1.6 percent in 1999 while the unemployment
rate is forecast to average 5.4 percent in 1997, 5.5 percent
in 1998, and 5.6 percent in 1999.
The moderation in the U.S. economy in 1997
through 1999 is expected to result from a slowdown in
demand by consumers and the federal government.  The
Federal Reserve, in an effort to fight inflation, is expected
to raise interest rates by three-quarters of a point by mid-
1997.  This policy is expected to weaken consumer
spending, a main spur of economic growth.  Continued
efforts to curb the budget deficit are expected to lead to a
continued reduction in federal government discretionary
spending in 1997 through 1999.  Discretionary spending,
which is spending excepting entitlement program
spending (such as Social Security and Medicare) and
debt interest payment, is forecast to decline in real terms
by 2.3 percent in fiscal 1997, 2.5 percent in 1998, and
3.0 percent in 1999.  As a result, the annual budget deficit
is forecast to stabilize at its current level of just above
$100 billion from 1997 through 1999.  A widening trade
gap in 1997 is forecast to be an additional drain on the
economy in that year.  It is worth noting, however, that
exports are expected to grow in 1997 but not as quickly
as imports.
Rising industrial production is forecast to aid the
national economy in 1999.  After growing 3.2 percent
in 1996, industrial production growth is forecast to grow
at 3.4 percent in 1997 and 3.0 percent in 1998 before
accelerating to 4.5 percent in 1999.  As a result, 1999 is
also forecast to be a strong year for growth in
manufacturing output and employment nationally.
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Kentucky General Fund Revenue
Estimates and Accuracy
Manoj Shanker
Providing accurate revenue forecasts is an important part of the budget process for the
Commonwealth of Kentucky.  Kentucky’s process of estimating state revenues comprises
models which take into account the economic environment, including national conditions,
in which revenues will be collected.  These models then provide forecasts for all the major
sources of general revenue, including individual income tax, sales and use tax, corporate
income tax, coal severance tax, property tax, and several other revenue sources.  Since
the late 1970s, accurate revenue forecasts have become increasingly important as state
law now requires state funds to be budgeted before they are spent.  For fiscal year 1996,
the absolute percentage error between the estimated and actual revenues was 1.27 percent.
The Office of Financial Management and Economic
Analysis (OFMEA) is responsible for analyzing the
economy of the Commonwealth of Kentucky and the
United States, and estimating revenues upon which the
Commonwealth’s budget is based.  The goal of the
revenue estimating and economic analysis function is to
provide timely, accurate General Fund and Road Fund
estimates, by detailed account, as the primary input to
the budget process.  In this article I have described the
modeling and estimation process for forecasting the
General Fund revenue and for evaluating the accuracy
of the forecast.
The key to an accurate revenue estimate is the
availability of good data, an understanding of the tax
code, and the ability to forecast the economic conditions
in which the revenue collections will occur.  Both the
revenue estimates and the underlying economic forecast
are prepared through the combined efforts of the revenue
estimating staff of OFMEA and the Consensus
Forecasting Group, comprising experts drawn from
universities and the Legislative Research Commission.
As a result of Kentucky’s biennial budget process, both
the economic and revenue estimates are prepared for a
three-year forecast horizon.  The revenue estimation
procedure is mapped in Figure 1.
At the heart of the revenue estimation process is a
dynamic response econometric model that forecasts the
economic environment in which revenue collection will
occur.  OFMEA has developed a quarterly
Macroeconomic Model of Kentucky (MAK) which
provides an analytical base for assessing the future
economic course of the Commonwealth.  The 35-equation
econometric model is designed to produce forecasts for
personal income and its components, and employment,
by industrial sector.  It also estimates the effect of changes
in the national economic outlook on the Kentucky
economy.  This latter feature enables us to prepare several
possible scenarios for the state economy and then
examine the revenue stream resulting from each of these
alternatives.
Most national econometric models are modifications
of a Keynesian general equilibrium system with
commodity markets, labor markets, financial markets,
and government operations.  Unfortunately, this
procedure cannot be translated to a state model for several
reasons.  First, there is the lack of state-specific data for
imports, exports, investment, and financial markets.  In
addition, topics of particular interest to states, such as
net migration and “export” to the rest of the nation, are
different from those that are of interest to the national
economy.  Because of these limitations, MAK has a
modified export-based structure and is a top-down model,
where national events drive the state equations.
The MAK model has a sectoral design.  This means
that a broad economic concept — for example, personal
income — is configured as a block of equations with the
components of personal income defined as separate
equations within the block.  The equations are of several
types:  simultaneous, recursive, and identities.  The
simultaneity occurs both within a particular sector and
between sectors.  The major blocks are personal income,
INTRODUCTION
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employment, and government finance.  (Originally there
were blocks of equation for both output and population.
These equations suffered in performance, however, and
reduced the overall accuracy of the model since the data
required for these areas of the state economy are fraught
with errors.)
After the economic environment facing Kentucky
and the U.S. has been established by MAK, the next
stage is the formulation of the General Fund estimate.
The estimates for the General Fund are developed
through a group of econometric and time-series models.
Each revenue source has its own method of estimation.
The formal revenue estimation models were developed
to provide consistency, replicability, and simplicity to
the forecasting process.  The output from these models
is enhanced by incorporating subjective input and
changes in administering and collecting taxes.
General Fund collections for fiscal year 1996 (FY96,
July 1, 1995 to June 30, 1996) were $5.3 billion.  The
sources of revenue and their contribution to the total are
shown in Figure 2.
In FY96 individual income tax collections totaled
$2.1 billion.  This is by far the largest tax and is tied
closely to the employment structure
and wages in the state.  The forecast
for income taxes is centered around
an accurate estimation of payroll
withholding, which constitutes about 90 percent of
individual income tax revenues.  Until 1993 an aggregate
figure for individual income tax was estimated
exclusively by a Bayesian Vector Autoregressive (BVAR)
model.  This model departs from the strict time series
Box-Jenkins approach in that exogenous parameters can
be factored into the forecast.  The exogenous parameters,
namely, nonagricultural employment, personal income,
and inflation, are derived from the MAK forecast of the
state economy.
In late 1992, following the tax law changes in 1990
and the national recession, we found that the BVAR
model was not providing a credible forecast for individual
income tax.  The performance was further hampered by
the delayed issuance of tax refunds and other
administrative details.  We decided to prepare two
alternative models for individual income taxes.  For a
forecast horizon of one to four quarters we developed a
Box-Jenkins model.  For extended forecasts we modeled
tax liability by decomposing it into six components,
namely, withholding, declaration payments, tax paid with
returns, additional tax billed, refunds due, and credit
carried forward.  The seven-equation tax liability model
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relies on calendar-year data and therefore circumvents
the problems associated with the timing of refunds.  The
shortcoming of this model is that data are available with
a lag of one year.  The exogenous data on the economy is
derived from the MAK model.
Earlier in 1996 we supplemented the tax liability
model by expanding the MAK model with an equation
for withholding.  This allows us to forecast with more
current data and strengthens the link between
withholdings and our economic assumptions.  The mean
absolute percentage error (MAPE) of this model is 2.3
percent.
In fiscal year 1996 collections from the sales and
use tax were $1.8 billion.  Like the individual income
tax, the sales tax is tied closely to wages and salaries,
specifically, disposable income.  Growth in consumption
in some instances exceeds income during
periods of high consumer confidence and
when interest rates are relatively low.
Some of these factors are explicitly
factored into the forecasting models, and others are used
implicitly through changes suggested by the Consensus
Forecasting Group.
A Bayesian Vector Autoregressive (BVAR) is
normally used for forecasting sales tax.  The
principal advantage of this estimating method is
that exogenous economic events are also
incorporated in the modeling equation.  The sales
tax equation is estimated using forecasted values
of Kentucky personal income, Kentucky
nonagricultural employment, and the U.S.
Consumer Price Index (CPI).
Sales tax receipts as reported by the Kentucky
Revenue Cabinet are not necessarily for the month
in which the sales occurred.  Since the tax receipts
data for a particular month reflects deposits for
the previous month, and not economic “activity,”
we adjust the sales tax data by assigning it to its
proper month in forecasting sales tax.  The data
are essentially assigned to the month in which the
actual transactions took place.  During periods of
prosperity, especially during the 1990s, the BVAR model
has on occasion underforecast sales taxes.  This may be
due to the inability of the model to incorporate increased
consumer confidence (which increases consumers’
willingness to spend).  It is in instances like this that the
Consensus Forecast Group becomes invaluable.
To forecast all other taxes — which amounted to
$1.5 billion in FY96 — we use a variety of mathematical
models and administrative input.  The corporation
income tax is estimated by linking it to
U.S. corporate tax liability and the past
history of the tax.  Receipts from this
tax were $284.7 million in FY96.  The coal severance
tax is estimated by forecasting Kentucky coal production
and prices.  Receipts from the coal severance tax were
$166.1 million in FY96.  The forecast for the property
tax is based on historical tax assessments, the Kentucky
economic outlook, statutory changes, and administrative
factors that affect the timing of the receipts.  Total
property tax receipts were $409.2 million in FY96.  Over
one hundred accounts constitute the rest of the General
Fund.  In most cases estimates are derived from the
historical growth patterns of the tax.  Revenue from all
other sources, including the state lottery, amounted to
$618.4 million in FY96.
Until the late 1970s the balance of power in the
Commonwealth was tilted in favor of the executive
branch.  Revenue forecasts were typically underestimated,
as the Governor had considerable discretion in spending
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In 1978 the General Assembly
modified state law to require the
funds to be budgeted before they
could be spent.  This removed the
incentive for systematic
underestimation, and accuracy
became increasingly important.
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surplus revenue.  In 1978 the General Assembly modified
state law to require the funds to be budgeted before they
could be spent.  This removed the incentive for systematic
underestimation, and accuracy became increasingly
important.  It has been observed that the “social and
political costs of deficits are typically greater than that
of surpluses” and mean forecasts are adjusted downward
to accommodate risk preferences.1  When revenues are
systematically overestimated, cuts must be imposed on
previously funded projects.  In case of an
underestimation, funding for certain programs are not
made available because of an expected tight budget
situation.  Since revenue estimates set the upper bound
for budgeting, it is important to have an accurate point
estimate.
Forecast errors do occur, however, and can be
attributed to three broad sources.  These include
uncertainty resulting from the economic cycle, data errors
from revisions and benchmark changes, and finally,
misspecification of the estimation model.  Although it is
tempting to compute the error resulting from economic
uncertainty, the methodology used to estimate this error
is itself flawed.  The input used to produce national
forecasts is also subject to periodic historical
benchmarking.  In fact, as of November 7, 1996, the
U.S. and Kentucky personal income data series before
1990 are incompatible with those after 1990.
Furthermore, even the state nonagricultural employment
data is benchmarked every year, and the revision can be
as much as 0.5 percent.
It is likewise tempting to decompose forecast errors
and ascribe much of the error to national benchmarking,
and the national outlook provided by a private forecasting
firm, in our case, DRI/McGraw-Hill.  This strategy has
limited theoretical foundation, however, and puts one in
a methodological mire.  I have addressed the question of
forecast accuracy in a more fundamental way, that is, by
examining the mean absolute percentage error (MAPE)
of the General Fund.
This puts us on a “high road” in the sense that
instead of explaining away errors, I have accepted them
for what they are.  What made this high ground easier to
adopt was the fact that the MAPE of the General Fund
forecast proved to be 1.40 percent, and the root mean
square (RMS) percentage error was 1.77 percent.  (MAPE
and RMS errors are used to evaluate the overall accuracy
of a simulation model.  To avoid false accuracy from
positive and negative deviations canceling each other
out, either the absolute value of the deviation is
considered — MAPE — or the deviation is squared and
then the square root considered as in the RMS error.
The latter is more useful since it penalizes large
individual errors more heavily.)  Table 1 shows the
estimated and actual General Fund revenue values for
FY89–FY96.
The errors in the forecast are quite modest in
statistical terms.  It is difficult to put the forecast error
in perspective by comparing it to similar errors in other
states.  Cross-state comparisons are not done very often,
and current data are unavailable.  In a 1989 study,
however, the mean absolute percentage error for all states
was 2.73 percent.2
In estimating the accuracy of the forecast I made
some critical assumptions.  Chief among them was the
time period over which the analysis was made.  The eight-
year period from FY89 to FY96 was the most logical
choice.  OFMEA developed the MAK model in early
1989, and many of the other models were adopted shortly
thereafter.  This allows us to examine the accuracy of
the models and the forecasting procedures currently in
use.
A WORD ABOUT THE
ESTIMATION TIME PERIOD
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
1 G. Cassidy, M.S. Kamlet, and D.S. Nagin, 1989, “An Empirical
Examination of Bias in Revenue Forecasts by State Governments,”
International Journal of Forecasting, 5, pp. 321-31.
2 Stuart I.. Bretschneider, Wilpen Gorr, Gloria Grizzle, and Earle Klay,
1989, “Political and Organizational Influence on the Accuracy of
Forecasting State Government Revenues,” International Journal of
Forecasting, 5, pp. 307-319.
  FOOTNOTES
TABLE 1
General Fund: Estimated and Actual Amounts
Fiscal Estimated Actual Absolute
year ($mil) % Error
FY89 $3,276.9 $3,289.9 0.40%
FY90 3,557.9 3,561.0 0.09
FY91 4,370.1 4,311.7 1.35
FY92 4,529.0 4,360.8 3.86
FY93 4,593.1 4,511.7 1.80
FY94 4,608.5 4,647.1 0.83
FY95 5,070.1 5,154.1 1.63
FY96 5,269.0 5,336.9 1.27
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percent.  The economy slowed in the fourth quarter with
an anemic 0.3 percent growth, and produced some fear
about a possible recession in 1996.
The unemployment rate, as Figure 2 shows, equaled
5.6 percent for six months in 1995 and ranged only from
a low of 5.4 percent to a high of 5.7 percent.  The
economy generated a healthy increase in jobs (as
measured by the increase in nonfarm payroll
employment) of 2.2 million, for an average of 185,250
additional jobs per month.
Inflation from December 1994 to December 1995,
as measured by the rise in the Consumer Price Index
(CPI), remained low at 2.7 percent.  The core inflation
rate, which excludes volatile food and energy prices, was
a bit higher at 3.0 percent.
The economy in 1996 achieved moderately high
growth, low inflation, and historically low
unemployment.  As Figure 1 shows, real GDP grew
substantially faster in 1996 than in 1995.  During the
first quarter of 1996, the economy grew at a 2.0 percent
annual rate, eliminating any fears of a recession following
the stagnant 1995 fourth quarter performance.  The
economy soared in the second quarter at a 4.7 percent
rate, causing substantial concerns over overheating and
rising inflation.  In the third quarter the economy settled
back to a more sustainable growth of 2.3 percent.  The
forecast for the fourth quarter has the economy growing
from around 2.2 to 2.4 percent, and if the economy
realizes this growth, it will have grown a respectable
In 1996 the United States economy achieved
moderately high growth with high levels of resource
utilization and low inflation.  The unemployment rate
dipped to levels not seen since 1973, and the economy
moved well into its sixth year of economic expansion
since the last recession in early 1991.  In fact, over the
entire period from 1983 to 1996, the U.S. economy has
recorded only two quarters of declines in total output.
Before explaining the performance of the U.S.
economy has been in 1996, and its potential for 1997, I
first summarize the 1995 economy.  The relatively high
growth of 1996 came on the heels of the 1995 “soft
landing.”
With the economy in 1994 on the verge of
overheating, the Federal Reserve launched a preemptive
strike against inflation with eight interest rate hikes from
February 1994 to February 1995.  The Federal Reserve
accomplished the delicate balance of slowing the
economy without also causing a recession, as the 1995
economy experienced a “soft landing” with moderate to
low growth and low inflation.
Real gross domestic product (GDP), the value of all
final goods and services produced in the U.S. adjusted
for inflation, grew 1.3 percent.  As Figure 1 shows, real
GDP barely grew at all during the first two quarters,
with annual growth rates of only 0.4 percent and 0.7
percent, but grew rapidly in the third quarter at 3.8
U.S. Economy Performs
Relatively Well in 1996
J. Robert Gillette
1995 ECONOMY EXPERIENCED
“SOFT LANDING”
1996 ECONOMY PERFORMS
RELATIVELY WELL
INTRODUCTION
During 1996, the U.S. economy saw moderately high growth with low inflation and
historically low unemployment.  Gross domestic product is forecast to have grown 2.8
percent for 1996.  The economy created approximately 2.5 million additional jobs in
1996, a 2.1 percent increase from 1995 levels.  Inflation again remained low, around 3.0
percent, and the Federal Reserve was reluctant to change interest rates throughout the
year on signs of a slowing economy.  The forecast for 1997 also calls for moderate growth
with low unemployment and low inflation.  Gross domestic product should average just
above 2 percent growth.  Unemployment rates should stay in the mid-5 percent range, and
inflation will again remain low, hovering around 3.0 percent.
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2.8 percent for 1996.
Unemployment rates dropped to their lowest levels
in 23 years.  As Figure 2 shows, unemployment equaled
5.8 percent in January, dipped to 5.1 percent in August,
and rose slightly to 5.2 percent in
October.  Through October, the
unemployment rate had averaged 5.4
percent for the year.  These are
historically low rates, and to see how low one needs to
consider the fact that the Bureau of Labor Statistics in
1994 revised the way it calculates unemployment,
implementing several significant improvements in the
data collection procedures.  These revised procedures,
however, raise unemployment rates about 0.5 percent
over rates calculated using the old procedures.  As a
result, to compare unemployment rates of 1996 with
periods before 1994, one needs to subtract about 0.5
percentage points from the 1996 rates.  (For example,
the 5.4 percent average for 1996 becomes 4.9 percent.)
Making this adjustment, unemployment rates in 1996
dropped to their lowest levels since 1973.
The U.S. economy continues to be an incredible job-
creating machine.  Since 1974 the economy has generated
an average of over 1.8 million jobs per year.  In 1996 the
economy did even better in creating jobs.  Nonfarm
payroll employment increased through October by 2.1
million, for an average of 209,100 additional jobs per
month.  At this rate the economy will create over 2.5
million additional jobs in 1996, a 2.1 percent increase
in total employment from 1995 levels.
Industrial production — the output of factories,
mines, and utilities — picked up in 1996.  As Figure 3
shows, the monthly index of industrial production
remained basically flat in 1995 (increasing only 1.1
percent) but increased at a healthy 4.7 percent annual
rate through the first nine months of 1996.  The index of
industrial production began in January at 122.5 percent
of its 1987 (baseline) average and rose to 127.1 percent
Employment
and Industry
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The U.S. economy continues to be
an incredible job-creating
machine.  Since 1974 the economy
has generated an average of over
1.8 million jobs per year.
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by September.
Inflation continued to remain low in 1996 for the
fifth year in a row, hovering around 3.0 percent.  From
January through September, inflation (as measured by
the CPI) equaled 3.2 percent.  The core rate of inflation,
however, which excludes food and
energy prices, equaled only 2.6 percent.
Both food and energy prices increased
considerably in 1996, pushing up the
overall inflation rate.
Largely due to the record high grain prices during
the summer, food prices increased 4.4 percent through
September.  The drought in the southern Plains early in
the year decimated wheat fields, and the heavy spring
rains in the Midwest delayed corn planting, all of which
sent wheat and corn prices soaring.  Weather conditions
have since improved, and grain prices have dropped
substantially since August.
Crude oil prices hit six-year highs and caused energy
prices to increase by 6.5 percent through September.
West Texas intermediate crude started the year at $19.50
per barrel, reached $25.93 in mid-October, and settled
back in mid-November to around $23.50, which still
represents about a 25 percent increase over 1995 prices.
Oil prices fluctuated over the year as the prospects for
the United Nations’ permission for Iraq to start exporting
petroleum on a limited basis (700,000 barrels per day)
fluctuated with the actions of Saddam Hussein.  Iraq,
one of the biggest oil producers in the world, has been
barred from selling oil since its 1990 invasion of Kuwait
and had not received UN permission to export by mid-
November.
Bad weather and increases in oil prices both
represent what economists call
adverse supply shocks.  Other
things constant, these two factors
cause a drag on the economy’s
growth rate and an increase in
inflation, as evidenced by the 1996
core inflation rate (which excludes
food and energy prices) of 2.6
percent considerably below the
overall 1996 inflation rate of 3.2
percent.  With weather conditions
improving, grain prices falling
substantially, and crude oil prices
stabilizing in the $23 range, the
gap between the core and overall
inflation rate should begin to
narrow.
The Federal Reserve in 1996
was as noticeable for what it did
not do as for what it did do.  Early
in the year, worried about the slowdown in the economy
at the end of 1995, the Fed backed up its interest rate cut
in December 1995 with another cut in late
January 1996.  Specifically, the Fed cut its
target for the federal funds rate (the rate banks
charge other banks for overnight loans) by a
quarter percentage point on each occasion, lowering the
rate to 5.25 percent.  With the economy picking up in
the latter half of the first quarter, the Fed then held rates
steady through the rest of the year as of mid-November.
The September meeting of the Fed’s policy-making arm,
the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), provided
some drama as most analysts predicted FOMC would
raise interest rates to slow the economy after the booming
4.7 percent growth rate of the second quarter.  Instead,
the Fed held rates steady, and, subsequently, when the
third quarter numbers indicated a slowing economy
growing at the more sustainable 2.2 percent, the Fed
policymakers looked like prophets.  At its next
policymaking meeting on December 17, look for the Fed
to continue to hold interest rates steady.
Interest rates went on a bit of a roller coaster ride
during 1996 as the expectations of inflation increased
and then decreased over the year.  The bellwether 30-
year Treasury bond rate started the year around 6.0
percent but increased steadily to 7.12 percent in May as
inflation fears kicked up with the rise in grain prices,
the increase in crude oil prices, and the rapidly improving
economy.  The long bond’s yield then hovered around
7.0 percent (peaking at 7.19 percent in July) through
September as inflation fears continued.  But, in October
with grain prices subsiding and the economy clearly
slowing, the 30-year rate dropped, reaching 6.66 percent
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by the month’s end.  The November election results gave
rates another boost down as the market anticipated
continued control of government spending and budget
deficits, and the long bond’s rate dipped to 6.48 percent
in mid-November.
The dollar attracted some attention as it hit a 42-
month high against the Japanese yen in late October at
114.36 yen per dollar.  After declining a couple of yen in
early November, the dollar had still gained over 10 yen
for the year for a 10 percent increase.
Against other currencies, the dollar also
gained but by less.  Against the German mark, the dollar
gained 5 percent, and against the Federal Reserve Board’s
index of ten major currencies (the currencies of the G-
10 countries), the dollar gained 2.7 percent.
For 1997, the economy should experience moderate
growth with low unemployment and low inflation.  The
forecasts for real GDP center just above 2 percent growth.
In July, the Federal Reserve in its 1996 semiannual report
to Congress predicted real GDP growth for 1997 of 1.75
to 2.25 percent.   DRI/McGraw-Hill forecasts growth to
be 2.1 percent, with a range of up to 2.5 percent in what
it calls its “generous” forecast and down to 1.4 percent
for its “stern” forecast.  In sum, for 1997 look for real
GDP growth of 2.1 to 2.2 percent, with growth of less
than 2 percent being a disappointment and growth in
the mid-2 percent range being a pleasant surprise.
Unemployment rates will continue to be low in 1997,
likely in the mid-5 percent range.  The Federal Reserve
predicts the unemployment rate will average between
5.5 and 5.75 percent.  DRI/McGraw-Hill forecasts an
average for 1997 of 5.5 percent, with its generous forecast
predicting 5.3 percent and its stern forecast an average
of 5.7 percent.
Inflation will continue to remain low in 1997,
hovering around 3 percent.  The Federal Reserve
forecasts an inflation rate for 1997 of 2.75 to 3.0 percent.
DRI/McGraw-Hill forecasts a 2.7 percent inflation rate,
with its generous and stern forecasts ranging from 2.8
percent to 2.5 percent.
U.S. Economy Performs Relatively Well in 1996
Currency
1997 FORECAST:  NOT QUITE
AS GOOD AS 1996
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Welfare Reform in Kentucky:  Has
“Welfare as We Know It” Changed?
William H. Hoyt and Kathleen Toma
On August 22, 1996, President Bill Clinton signed
into law the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (hereafter,
Reconciliation Act), otherwise known as the welfare
reform bill.  This legislation promises to fundamentally
change the nature of the American welfare system.
Perhaps the greatest change will be the shift from
entitlement to block grant funding.  States will play a
far greater role in the administration of welfare services,
and several former assistance programs — Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), Emergency
Assistance (EA), and Job Opportunities and Basic Skills
(JOBS) — will be replaced with a single block grant
program, Temporary Assistance to Needy Families
(TANF).  Under TANF each state will have significant
authority in setting its own rules on how to use federal
(and state) funds.  While block grant funding will provide
more flexibility for states to design welfare programs, it
will also eliminate the traditional relationship where
federal contributions to state welfare programs depended
on the number of state residents on welfare.  With welfare
reform, increases and decreases in a state’s welfare rolls
will have no impact on the federal aid the state receives.
Not all federal guidelines and restrictions on the
use of AFDC funds (now TANF) have been eliminated.
In fact, two major new restrictions can be expected to
change the financial responsibilities of states.  Broadly,
they concern the length of time recipients can receive
TANF benefits and the number (percentage) of recipients
who must be participating in some form of employment
or training program.  Recipient families will face a
lifetime limit of five years on TANF, and all adult
recipients who can work must obtain employment or
engage in approved training programs after two years.
The Reconciliation Act has created myriad issues
that will affect how states provide welfare assistance.  In
addition to summarizing the legislation, our attention
will focus on the impacts of what we believe are three
important changes created by the Act:  1) the change
from entitlement to block grant funding, 2) the two-year
limit on continuous TANF assistance, and 3) the work
requirements placed on the states to receive TANF
funding.  In particular, we will examine the following:
• Financial impact of welfare reform on Kentucky.
How will welfare reform affect both the federal funds
received by Kentucky and the taxes Kentucky residents
might pay?
• Characteristics of welfare recipients, with emphasis
on prior employment experience and education of
recipients who have spent more than two years on AFDC.
As we show, the education and experience of AFDC
recipients varies dramatically across the state, suggesting
that success in reducing welfare rolls also may vary
significantly across Kentucky.
• Impact of welfare reform in different regions,
especially as it concerns employment conditions.
Specifically, we examine how well a region can absorb
the increase in its labor force due to more recipients being
forced off welfare and into work.  Again, we find dramatic
differences across regions:  In Eastern Kentucky, former
AFDC recipients comprise a significant fraction of the
The recently passed welfare reform act will place greater responsibility for welfare programs
on states, changing funding from entitlements to block grants, imposing strict limits on
receiving welfare benefits, and creating work requirements.  Many recipients will likely
have difficulty in the transition from welfare to work.  Many of them have never held a job,
and low education levels among recipients will also be a barrier to work.  Furthermore,
some regions in the state will not be able to absorb these former recipients into the labor
market.  The large urban areas of the state will have the best employment opportunities,
and migration out of rural areas may occur as former recipients there may not find work.
The work participation requirements will also place a burden on the state.  Perhaps the
greatest difficulty will be finding and paying for child care for recipients who must work.
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current labor force, while in urban regions, AFDC
recipients forced to enter the labor market comprise only
a small fraction of the labor force.
• Impact of the TANF work requirements.  We discuss
the experiences of JOBS programs in a number of states
and look at how these experiences might influence the
structure of a JOBS program in Kentucky.
Using block grants instead of entitlements may be
the most dramatic change of welfare reform.  As an
entitlement, federal funds received by a state were based
on the number of individuals eligible for AFDC and the
amount of funding provided
by the state itself.  For
example, Kentucky faced a
70/30 funding match,
meaning that 70 percent of funding came from the federal
government and 30 percent came from Kentucky.  In
other words, for every $1.00 that Kentucky contributed,
it received an additional $2.33 in federal funds.  This
70/30 match was among the most generous in the nation;
many states with higher per capita incomes and more
spending per recipient faced a 50/50 match, meaning
that for every $1.00 the state contributed it received an
additional $1.00 from the federal government.  Since
federal funds also depended on the size of the AFDC
rolls, a 20 percent increase in the rolls because of an
economic downturn would likewise increase federal
funds by 20 percent.  Under this entitlement scheme,
federal spending on AFDC increased from $23.5 billion
in 1980 to $138.7 billion in 1992 while state spending
increased from $21.5 billion to $65.3 billion during the
same period.  Adjusted for inflation, these figures
represent increases of 347 percent in real federal
spending and 178 percent in real state spending.1
Funding under TANF comes in block grants that,
with a few exceptions, sever the link between federal
funding and the number of recipients as well as the link
between federal and state funding.2  Now, if a state’s
welfare rolls increase, the state will not receive additional
funds, or, if a state increases its funding, it will not receive
any additional funds to match its contribution.  This block
grant is based on federal funding the state would have
received in fiscal year 1997 based on the entitlement
formula.
The link between the amount of the block grant and
the previous federal funding received by a state may place
Kentucky at a disadvantage relative to other states,
particularly when compared to its funding under the
entitlement structure.  Kentucky has traditionally been
a state with a low average payment per AFDC recipient
family, spending $211 per month for the typical family
in 1993 while the national average was $381, with ten
states spending over $500.  Because of its small
contributions to AFDC in the past, Kentucky will receive
a smaller TANF block grant than states who contributed
more to AFDC and therefore received more matching
federal funds.  Thus, Kentucky will receive 70 percent,
or $148, of its $211 per family allocation, while
Minnesota, for example, with a payment of $501 and a
50/50 match, will receive $250 per family.
TANF guidelines do require a minimum amount of
state spending and under certain conditions, the amount
of federal funding a state receives can increase.  TANF
insures a state contribution through its Maintenance of
Effort (MOE) clause, which says that a state must
contribute at least 80 percent of its 1994 state
expenditures to “qualified state expenditures,” which
include cash assistance, child care assistance, educational
activities related to employment, administrative
expenditures (no more than 15 percent), and other
spending consistent with the goals of the TANF block
grant.  For Kentucky this means that the state must
contribute $70 million.  If the state meets its work
participation requirements, however, it need only
contribute 75 percent of its 1994 state expenditures.  For
Kentucky this figure would be $66 million.
Finally, to receive full federal funding through
TANF, Kentucky must meet its work requirements and
place restrictions on the duration of benefits for
recipients.  States may receive bonus payments for
exceptional performance in placing recipients in work
activities and by reducing out-of-wedlock births and teen
pregnancies.  These bonuses can increase federal funding
by up to five percent.
The financial impact of TANF on Kentucky is very
difficult to forecast.  Uncertainties about how states will
respond to TANF work requirements make predictions
even more difficult.
One possible means of
estimating the cost of
the work requirements
is to consider the cost of
the penalties that will be incurred by the state if it fails
to meet the work activities requirement.
Under TANF Kentucky will receive $181.3 million
from the federal government in fiscal year 1997.  The
1997 fiscal year budget for Kentucky assumed $171.5
million from the federal government for programs that
TANF replaces (AFDC, EA, JOBS).  Thus, the state
begins the fiscal year with an increase in federal funds
of almost $10 million.  This $181.3 million, however,
cannot increase during the fiscal year, so how Kentucky
fares under the new funding plan depends on what the
FINANCIAL IMPACT OF WELFARE REFORM
Kentucky Funding and
Payments with TANF
The New Funding
Formula
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federal funds received under TANF and AFDC.
A state can face a five percent reduction in funds
the first year it
fails to meet
the work
requirement.
Each year after that the penalty increases by two
percent to a maximum of twenty-one percent.
Then, if Kentucky did not meet its work
requirement in 1997, federal funding in 1998
would drop to $172.2 million.  If it again failed
to meet work requirements in 1998, 1999
funding would be 93 percent of $181.3 million,
or $168.6 million.  Additional penalties would
provide funding of $164.0 million in 2000,
$161.4 million in 2001, and $157.7 million in
2002.
In Table 1b we incorporate these penalties
into the difference between funding under TANF
and under the entitlement structure.  The
differences between the two programs listed in
Table 1b should be interpreted as bounds on the
difference in the two programs when the costs
of work requirements are considered.  Presumably, if
meeting the work experience goals would cost more than
the penalty, states would simply accept the penalty.  By
comparing Table 1a and Table 1b we can see the impact
of not meeting the work requirements.  If Kentucky were
not to meet the work requirements in each of the first
six years of TANF, its payment would be reduced by 11
percent, or $23.6 million.
Of course, if Kentucky’s federal funds are to be
reduced as a result of welfare reform, we can expect the
federal funding of other states to be reduced as well,
presumably leading to lower taxes paid by Kentucky
residents.  The Congressional
Budget Office (CBO) projects
reductions in federal spending from
welfare reform of $3.0 billion in
1997, $8.3 billion in 1998, $9.4 billion in 1999, $10.3
billion in 2000, $10.7 billion in 2001, and $12.7 billion
in 2002.3  The majority of these reductions are not due
to lower expected payments under TANF as compared
to AFDC but instead are due to reductions in Food Stamps
and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) payments as a
result of the legislation.  The CBO projects spending for
cash assistance would be ten percent lower in 2002 than
under the previous entitlement programs.  This would
result in a savings of $1.64 billion.
How might this reduction in spending affect
Kentucky residents?  That depends on how, and if, this
tax savings (or budget deficit reduction) is allocated.  If
this savings were applied to reducing every individual’s
expected increase in funding under the traditional
entitlement approach might have been.  Of course,
funding under the entitlement program was uncertain
because it depended on both economic conditions and
the state’s contributions.  From 1970 to 1993, the average
yearly increase in AFDC expenditures in Kentucky was
7.6 percent.  The rate of increase, however, varied
dramatically from year to year and also represented
several major changes in AFDC, which makes spending
increases of 7.6 percent unlikely without program
revisions.
Table 1a projects the differences in funding under
TANF and if funding under the previous entitlement
programs increased at several alternative rates.  The
lowest rates are intended to show increases in federal
funding that only reflect the current (low) rate of
inflation.  As Table 1 indicates, if the rate of increase
under the entitlement plan were 2.5 percent, federal
funding would be greater under TANF from 1997–1999.
At a 5.0 percent rate of growth, federal funding is greater
under TANF only for 1997 and 1998 and by 2002, there
is a difference of $37.6 million, almost 20 percent of
federal funding under TANF.  Thus, even under relatively
conservative scenarios, in the near future Kentucky will
be receiving fewer federal funds with TANF relative to
the traditional entitlement programs.
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Funding and Work
Requirements
To indicate the impact the work requirements under
TANF might have on the cost of implementing welfare
reform in a state, we incorporate the impact on failing to
meet the work requirements into our comparison of the
Funding and
Tax Reduction
TABLE 1
Difference in Federal Funding under TANF and
Previous AFDC Programs
A. Projected differences between TANF and AFDC
if work requirements are met ($millions)
Projected spending
growth with AFDC 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
2.5% 9.8 5.5 1.1 -3.4 -8.0 -12.7
3.0% 9.8 4.7 -0.6 -6.1 -11.7 -17.5
5.0% 9.8 1.2 -7.8 -17.2 -27.2 -37.6
7.5% 9.8 -3.1 -16.9 -31.8 -47.7 -64.9
B. Projected differences between TANF and AFDC
if work requirements are not met ($millions)
Projected spending
growth with AFDC 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
2.5% 9.8 -3.6 -11.6 -19.7 -27.9 -36.3
3.0% 9.8 -4.4 -13.3 -22.4 -31.6 -41.1
5.0% 9.8 -7.8 -20.5 -33.5 -47.1 -61.2
7.5% 9.8 -12.1 -29.6 -48.1 -67.6 -88.5
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income taxes by the same percentage, then the amount
saved by Kentucky taxpayers is simply based on the
fraction of taxes paid by Kentucky residents.  In 1992,
1.07 percent of individual income taxes in the country
were paid by Kentucky residents, which would translate
to a savings of $17.5 million from switching from
entitlement to block grant funding.4  In the absence of
any penalty and at a three percent rate of increase in
entitlement spending in Kentucky, this would result in
no change in net federal funds to or from Kentucky.  If
Kentucky is penalized, the state would see a reduction
in net federal funds as a result of this legislation.  Based
on projected population in Kentucky in 2000 and this
proportionate reduction in taxes, welfare reform would
reduce taxes of Kentucky residents by $25.67 per capita.5
While TANF work restrictions may increase states’
costs, the two- and five-year time limits should reduce
these costs.  Based on information about all Kentucky
AFDC recipients in July 1993, Table 2 gives a breakdown
of spell lengths for AFDC recipients.  In 1993, 57 percent
of the recipients had been
on AFDC less than two
years, while 85 percent
had been on less than five
years.  Approximately 48
percent of recipients from 1990 to 1993 in Kentucky
were on AFDC less than two years.
Based on these breakdowns, the two-year limit on
welfare stays would lead to a savings of approximately
45 percent in current spending.  This savings, of course,
is overly optimistic since many recipients who reach the
two-year limit will not find private employment with
sufficient income to remove them from the rolls; hence,
they will still receive benefits.  Limiting the maximum
spell length to five years or less would save approximately
Welfare Reform in Kentucky:  Has “Welfare as We Know It” Changed?
20 percent.  CBO estimates for all states a reduction of
30 to 40 percent in cash assistance rolls as a result of the
five-year limit.6  Thus, we should expect at the least a
savings of 20 percent because of the lifetime limit and at
the most a savings of 45 percent because of the two-year
limit without work activities, although the actual savings
will likely fall around the low end of the CBO estimate,
or approximately 30 percent.
To understand the impact of time limits and work
requirements, we now examine some characteristics of
AFDC recipients from June 1991 to June 1993, beginning
with how these characteristics
vary with length of stay.  Table 3
provides education, work
experience, and family structure
breakdowns based on spell length for the entire state.
The percentage of recipients having out-of-wedlock births
tends to increase as the length of stay increases.
The percentage of recipients having little or no work
experience does likewise, perhaps reflective of their
having out-of-wedlock children, particularly when the
recipients are young.  Thirty-nine percent of recipients
who have stays of less than two years have never or only
occasionally worked, while 50 percent of recipients with
stays exceeding two years have never or only occasionally
worked.  While education levels differ little among
recipients with stays exceeding four years, there is a
noticeable difference in the percentage of recipients with
less than eight years of education between recipients
having spells of two years or less (13 percent) and
recipients who have spell lengths exceeding two years
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CHARACTERISTICS OF AFDC
RECIPIENTS IN KENTUCKY
Overview of the
Commonwealth
Impact of Spell
Limits on Case Load
and Expenditures
TABLE 2
Number of Cases by Spell Length and the Impact of Spell Limits
on Case Load and Expenditures, July 1995
Length of stay (in years)
Less 2 - 3 3 - 4 4 - 5 5 - 6 6 - 7 7 - 8 8 - 99-10 More Entire
than 2 than 10 sample
Number of cases 38,647 10,340 5,761 3,414 2,211 1,535 1,262 1,055 816 3,072 68,113
Average grant $211 223 212 219 222 223 225 223 225 222 $215
Total payments ($1,000) $8,137 2,305 1,222 749 491 342 284 235 183 681 $14,629
Percentage of total
cases in category 57% 15 8 5 3 2 2 2 1 5 100%
Percentage of total
expenditures in category 56% 16 8 5 3 2 2 2 1 5 100%
Percentage of total
expenditures in category
and longer spell categories 45% 29 20 15 12 9 8 6 5 N/A
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(20 percent).  Not surprisingly, the longer the stay on
AFDC, the older the recipient and the less likely he or
she has young children.
In a number of respects, there is little difference
among AFDC recipients based on how long they stay on
the program.  But with respect to the education and
previous work experience — two characteristics that will
likely influence their employment chances — those
recipients staying longer than two years are at a definite
disadvantage.
Table 4 shows the characteristics of recipients who
have been on AFDC for more than two years in July
1993 according to the Area Development District (ADD)
in which they reside.  The most notable comparisons
are, again, education and work
experience.  The areas which can
expect the greatest difficulty in
obtaining employment for long-
term recipients are in south and
southeastern Kentucky, where as little as 33 percent of
the long-term recipients in Cumberland Valley and Lake
Cumberland ADDs have at least a high school degree,
and 34 percent in Kentucky River ADD have eight years
of education or less.  Most long-term recipients
demonstrate little experience in the labor market, with
most ADDs ranging from a minimum of 40 percent who
have had little or no work experience (Northern Kentucky
and Bluegrass are exceptions at 37 percent) to a
maximum of 73 percent for Kentucky River.  In addition,
all ADDs in eastern and southeastern Kentucky show
well over the state average of 50 percent.
These low education and work experience levels in
southeastern Kentucky (Big Sandy, KY River,
Cumberland Valley, and Lake Cumberland ADDs) hold
for men and women, with a more pronounced effect for
men.  Overall, women on AFDC longer than five years
have an average of ten years of education, while men
have an average of only eight years.  But as already stated,
there tends to be a concentration of male recipients in
these four ADDs in south and southeastern Kentucky as
is little to no work experience among recipients.  These
ADDs can expect to have the most difficulty in
transforming welfare recipients to members of the labor
force.
The Reconciliation Act requires Kentucky to reduce
its welfare rolls and move its recipients into jobs.  To
understand better how Kentucky can accomplish this,
we more closely examine
what characteristics of
AFDC recipients affect their
length of stay.  We are
particularly interested in
those characteristics that the state may be able to
influence, namely, education and work experience.
To examine the length of stay of AFDC recipients,
we examine recipients’ hazard rates, the probability a
recipient will leave the program in the next month given
the number of months he or she has already been on the
program.  For example, a hazard rate of 4.5 percent for
the seventh month of assistance means 4.5 percent of
recipients who have been in the program six months
leave the program in the seventh month.
TABLE 3
Length of stay (in years)
Characteristics of AFDC Recipients by Length of Stay
Less More 2 - 3 3 - 4 4 - 5 5 - 6 6 - 7 7 - 8 8 - 9 9 - 10 More Entire
than 2 than 2 than 10 sample
% of sample 65% 36 13 7 3 2 2 2 1 1 4 100%
Grant $186 200 198 193 198 199 204 204 215 204 222 $191
Age 29 33 31 31 32 34 34 35 37 37 38 31
Male 10% 8 10 7 8 10 8 10 6 1 6 10%
Nonwhite 17% 18 16 19 22 15 16 19 22 19 23 17%
Education, years 10.8 10.4 10.7 10.7 10.3 10.1 10.1 10.0 10.3 10.0 10.2 10.7
Education, less than 8 years 13% 20 16 16 22 25 22 31 25 29 23 15%
Education, 12 or more years 51% 44 49 48 41 40 32 38 47 38 40 49%
Employed 20% 18 19 20 24 15 14 16 18 13 16 19%
Never worked 19% 36 28 34 32 42 40 45 46 55 54 25%
Never or occasionally worked 39% 50 41 46 46 56 55 61 58 65 74 43%
Wages $110 93 93 112 130 83 73 95 68 76 57 $104
Family size 2.9 3.0 3.1 3.1 3.0 3.0 2.8 3.1 3.0 2.8 3.1 3.0
Number of children 1.5 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.9 1.9 1.6 1.9 1.6
Children under 2 28% 12 16 11 10 10 9 5 10 8 9 23%
Children under 6 10% 9 13 9 8 6 4 3 3 3 4 9%
Children over 16 9% 13 11 11 12 13 19 15 16 15 21 11%
Out-of-wedlock birth 40% 47 38 47 50 51 49 55 49 58 64 43%
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Figure 1 shows four recipients who are
representative of the general AFDC population.  These
four representative recipients were chosen to highlight
the impact on the length of AFDC stays of specific
recipient and household characteristics:  level of
education, marital status, and the combination of having
a young child and never being married.
Figure 1 also shows the fraction of each of the four
representative recipients for each month that will leave
AFDC in or before that month.  These values show the
impact family structure and education have on how long
a recipient may stay on AFDC if no limits were imposed.
For example, we observe that 38 percent of recipients
represented by recipient (3) will leave AFDC in less than
a year while 26 percent of recipients represented by (4)
leave in less than a year.  The difference
of four years of education accounts for a
difference of five percent between the
probability of leaving AFDC for recipient
(1) and recipient (2).  These differences
become more dramatic over time:  53
percent of the recipients represented by
(3) leave in less than two years while only
37 percent of the recipients represented
by (4) leave in less than two years.  After
two years, 48 percent of recipients
represented by (1) leave while only 41
percent of recipients represented by (2)
leave.  These representative recipients
suggest that:  1) an increase in education
has a significant impact on reducing the
length of AFDC stays and 2) marital
status affects AFDC stays, with the impact
of a recipient’s never being married
greatly increasing the length of stay.
Table 4, as discussed in the preceding section, shows
significant differences in the work experience and
education of long-term AFDC
recipients among ADDs in
Kentucky.  These differences in
experience and education are
likely to lead to differences in
the success of recipients in finding employment when
forced to leave the welfare rolls.
In addition to work experience and education,
however, we must also consider labor market conditions
in recipients’ regions when predicting their ability to
find employment.  Table 4 provides for the 15 ADDs the
Characteristics of AFDC Recipients by Area Development District
Area Development % of % of % of Retail Unemployment
District Population Employment and Service Rate
Purchase 5% 1.2% 2.9% 7.6%
Pennyrile 5 2.2 7.4 9.5
Green River 5 3.2 7.9 8.0
Barren River 5 0.3 0.8 7.0
Lincoln Trail 4 4.0 12.7 8.8
KIPDA 5 0.2 0.5 6.0
Northern KY 4 0.4 0.9 4.9
Buffalo Trace 6 5.2 17.0 7.4
Gateway 8 17.4 45.3 10.5
FIVCO 8 4.7 11.3 11.2
Big Sandy 11 3.0 6.9 13.3
KY River 14 3.0 7.1 14.3
Cumberland Valley 13 1.8 4.3 13.5
Lake Cumberland 9 1.5 4.6 9.9
Bluegrass 5 0.2 0.5 6.5
TABLE 4
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FIGURE 1
Fraction of Recipients Leaving by Months on Program, Different Recipient Characteristics
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unemployment rate, the percent of total employment
represented by AFDC recipients, and the percent
employment of the retail and service industries these
recipients will comprise when forced into the labor
market.  (Presumably, many former recipients will find
employment in the retail and service industries.)  Table
4 shows wide variation among ADDs in the share of the
labor force former AFDC recipients would comprise.  For
large urban areas, former recipients would comprise a
small share of the entire labor force as well as retail and
service employment.  For several largely rural ADDs,
however, former recipients would comprise over 10
percent of all retail and service employment.  Hence, the
major urban areas in Kentucky likely will be far more
able to employ former recipients than will rural areas,
especially those in Eastern Kentucky.  Figure 2 provides
a graphical summary of these same characteristics.
Compounding difficulties in recipients’ transition
to work will be the high unemployment rates in ADDs
where these recipients would comprise a large share of
the labor force.  Predictably, urban ADDs have much
lower unemployment rates (KIPDA, 6.0 percent;
Northern Kentucky, 4.9 percent; Bluegrass, 6.5 percent)
than the rural ADDs (10 to 14 percent for the ADDs in
south and southeastern Kentucky.)  Figures 3a and 3b
show this relationship between unemployment and
former recipients’ percentage of the labor supply.  There
is a definite positive relationship between the two factors,
implying that counties with more former recipients
seeking work also have higher unemployment rates.  This
mix of a large number of recipients forced off AFDC,
high unemployment, and few jobs, particularly in the
service and retail sectors, is not simply a problem for
former recipients — competition for jobs could reduce
employment for the unemployed and decrease wages (or
wage growth) for those residents with jobs.
The above conditions may make the adoption of a
relocation assistance program a good if not necessary
policy, whereby the state provides financial assistance
to recipients who wish to move to obtain employment in
other areas.7  These employment figures also reinforce
many predictions about welfare reform — that it will
cause migration from the impoverished Applachian
regions of Kentucky to the urban regions with their lower
unemployment rates and greater employment
opportunities.8  Without such migration, it is difficult to
believe employment and wages could respond enough
in Appalachian Kentucky to absorb the increases in the
labor force that welfare reform will generate.
FIGURE 2
Characteristics of AFDC Recipient Area Development District, and ADD Unemployment Rate
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Work requirements for recipients and minimum
work participation rates are a radical departure from
AFDC.  All adults in families receiving assistance must
participate in work activities
after two years.
Furthermore, any recipients
receiving assistance for
more than two months must
participate in community services if they are not engaged
in accepted work activities, which include unsubsidized
employment, subsidized private or public employment,
on-the-job training, vocational training (not more than
12 months), GED program for adults or high school for
teenage recipients, and child care provider for individuals
participating in community services.  Work activities that
are not acceptable include adult basic education and
literacy classes and work experience (unless private sector
work is limited).
FIGURE 3
In addition to these activities, recipients have a
minimum work hours per week equal to 20 hours for
1997–1998, 25 hours in 1999, and 30 hours for 2000
and beyond.  Two-parent families are required to
participate a minimum of 35 hours a week.  With federal
approval, the state can exempt some recipients from this
requirement, but these individuals still are included when
calculating recipient participation rates for the state.
Moreover, states must now have a much higher
percentage of their recipients in employment or training
programs to avoid financial penalties.  Under the 1988
welfare reforms, states were required to have 10 percent
of their recipients in training or employment programs.
In fiscal year 1997, the new legislation states that 25
percent of all recipients must be employed or take part
in training programs.  This figure increases by five
percent each year until 2002, when it will remain at 50
percent.  Furthermore, the new legislation requires 75
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Work Requirements,
Participation Rates,
and Work Activities
B. AFDC Recipients as Percentage of Retail and Service Employment versus Unemployment Rate
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percent of all recipient families with two adults in 1997
and 90 percent in 2002 to have at least one adult working
or in a training program.
These mandatory work participation rates will likely
prove the greatest challenge for Kentucky and prove to
be extremely expensive.  The largest expense will go to
child care services for recipients’ children, while job
search, training, and transportation subsidies will be quite
expensive as well.  For example, for a female recipient
to find employment at 30 to 40 hours a week, the state
may have to care for her two children under age six at a
cost of $100 a week.  The monthly cost of child care,
therefore, is $400, substantially more than the average
$225 Kentucky was paying in AFDC benefits for a one-
adult, two-child household.  Of course, if the recipient is
receiving vocational training, participating in community
service, or working in subsidized public or private
employment, Kentucky will have to pay these subsidy
costs as well.  In fact, the Congressional Budget Office,
using states’ performance in the Job Opportunities and
Basic Skills (JOBS) program, assumed that states would
not meet the required participation rates and face a
penalty of up to five percent but probably on the order of
0.5 percent.
One unintended consequence of welfare reform
concerns the classification of former recipients who have
found private employment.  If a state is very successful
in finding private, unsubsidized employment for many
recipients, it may be more likely to fail to meet its
participation rates for job assistance and training
programs.  Because these persons no longer count as
“recipients,” the state will not receive any credit for them
when trying to meet its participation rates.  Thus, the
state’s welfare rolls will be left with only the truly
unemployable, and the state will have no chance of
meeting the participation rate goals.
Since work activities include training, some
education, and job search assistance, it is worth
examining the past experiences with these types of
programs.  One of the more
interesting aspects of the
Reconciliation Act is that community work experience,
one of the major work activities used in the JOBS
program, is only acceptable in special circumstances.
Traditionally, training and job search programs have been
viewed as having little effect in increasing earnings or
reducing welfare rolls.
Evidence from programs in the 1980s and early
1990s, however, seems to indicate a positive impact on
earnings and a reduction in welfare rolls from these
employment programs.9  Two relevant employment
programs occurred in West Virginia and Arkansas, where
many of the AFDC participants live in rural areas, much
like in Kentucky.  In Arkansas, two groups, one which
participated in a job search program and work experience
and one which did not, were compared.  At the end of
three years only 32.8 percent of the recipients who
participated in the employment programs were still on
AFDC compared to 40.1 percent of the recipients who
did not participate, and 34 percent more of the
participants in the employment program were employed
at the end of three years.  In contrast, in West Virginia,
the employment program consisted of only work
experience with no job search assistance.  There, the
program had almost no impact on welfare rolls or
payments.10  These results show that work experience
programs are not acceptable unless there is very limited
private employment in an area.  Unfortunately, the
Reconciliation Act only allows four weeks of job
assistance, a type of program that seems to have had
success in the past.
While there is evidence that employment assistance
programs can have positive impacts, these results are
based on much smaller numbers of recipients.  Large-
scale programs are less likely to show success since more
recipients will have limited education and work
experience.  Furthermore, while these programs have
demonstrated success in finding employment for AFDC
recipients, their cost-effectiveness is less clear.  They may
prove relatively effective on a long-term basis but quite
expensive in the short term.
Welfare reform has increased Kentucky’s options
for providing assistance to low-income families with
dependent children.  This increased flexibility will not
come without a cost, however.  Kentucky can expect
increases in payments from the federal government under
the block grant structure only in the most severe economic
downturns.  Kentucky residents will have to pay for
increases in rolls due to mild recessions.
Work Activities
CONCLUSIONS
Welfare Reform in Kentucky:  Has “Welfare as We Know It” Changed?
COSTS OF WELFARE TO WORK
These mandatory work
participation rates will likely prove
the greatest challenge for
Kentucky and prove to be
extremely expensive.
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
36 CENTER FOR BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC RESEARCH
Welfare Reform in Kentucky:  Has “Welfare as We Know It” Changed?
The work requirements and lifetime limit on benefits
will profoundly affect cash assistance.  In Kentucky, this
impact will be greatest in the Appalachian region, where
the combination of limited education and work
experience among recipients, a large fraction of the
population receiving AFDC benefits, few jobs, and high
unemployment make future employment prospects bleak.
As a result of this legislation, Kentucky should be
prepared for and perhaps encourage migration from these
areas to urban areas, where unemployment rates are lower
and job opportunities greater.  Finally, if Kentucky is to
“end welfare as we know it,” it must be prepared to pay
for it.  The shift from entitlements to block grants shifts
greater responsibility to the states.  Past experiences
indicate that for some recipients appropriate employment
programs can succeed in reducing welfare rolls and costs.
But instituting these programs will be expensive, and
their benefits will likely not be seen until much further
in the future.
6 From CBO report on H.R. 3734, August 9, 1996, Table 1, p. 4.
7 See Chad Carlton, “New limits on welfare take effect,” Lexington
Herald-Leader, October 2, 1996, p. A1.
8 See Bob Geiger and Karen Samples, “Welfare reform may spur mountain
people to move,” Lexington Herald-Leader, August 18, 1996, p. A1.
9 See Judith Gueron, “Work and Welfare:  Lessons on Employment
Programs,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 4(1), 1990, pp. 79-98;
Robert Moffit, “Incentive Effects of the U.S. Welfare System:  A Review,”
30(1), 1992, pp. 1-61; General Accounting Office, “Welfare to Work:
Most AFDC Programs are not Emphasizing Job Placement,” 1995, GAO/
HEHS-95-113.
10 See Gueron (1990).
1 Figures are based on Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1995,
Table No. 585, p. 375.  Figures for state spending include state general
public aid and thus are somewhat higher than a state’s share of AFDC
funding.
2 While federal funds are no longer directly related to AFDC rolls, states
can receive contingency funding which is triggered either by changes in
the state’s unemployment rate or its number of food stamp recipients.
3 From Congressional Budget Office report on H.R. 3734, August 9, 1996,
Table 1, p. 28.
4 Calculated using Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1995, Table
537, p. 347.
5 Calculated using population projection Series A from Statistical Abstract
of the United States, 1995, Table 35, p. 34.
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More Efficient Financing of Higher
Education:  The Case for Tuition Increases
Dan A. Black and Amitabh Chandra
INTRODUCTION
A case for the elimination of tuition subsidies at public universities in Kentucky can be
made after studying their impact on equity, efficiency, competition, and the level of
educational quality.  We describe the rationale for determining tuition schedules in Kentucky
and demonstrate various inefficient consequences of the current system.  Insofar as higher
education in the state should be subsidized because certain students are financially
constrained, it makes little sense to provide that subsidy to all students regardless of
income levels.  Eliminating the “need-blind” component of this subsidy would be the first
requirement of any response to the current problem of funding.  It would also free up
millions of dollars of revenues that could be returned to taxpayers or used for expenditures
in other areas of need.
“We must tell these officials that it’s not OK to raise our
tuition, especially not without consulting us…So get out
there today at 11:30 and show that you don’t want to pay
more for your education…What we do today affects what
will happen tomorrow.  (Don’t forget that one day you
may have to pay for your son’s or daughter’s college
education.) You can influence your own future, stand up
for your rights and even have a good excuse to skip class.”
November 2, 1994, editorial in the Kentucky
Kernel, the University of Kentucky student
newspaper, encouraging students to protest a $40
tuition increase.
Opponents of tuition increases at public colleges and
universities have become increasingly active and vocal.
For example, at the University of Kentucky in 1994, over
five hundred students walked out of classes and disrupted
traffic to protest a proposed 3.7 percent increase in
tuition, representing a $40 increase.1  As the above
Kentucky Kernel quotation illustrates, some students at
public institutions argue that tuition subsidies should be
considered as rights, with little regard for the motivations
behind the increase.  Yet the tuition that students pay in
Kentucky’s public institutions is several thousand dollars
below that of their counterparts in Kentucky’s private
schools.  It also draws attention to the efficiency with
which students and their supporters are able to garner
support for their cause. In such an environment, to
suggest the case to the contrary is often viewed as heresy.
Higher education receives two types of
appropriations: student aid and tuition subsidies. The
first, student aid, is direct assistance to students and
includes programs such as Pell grants, Perkins and
Stafford loans, and work-study arrangements.2  All of
these programs explicitly incorporate a student’s “need”
in determining the size of the award.  As a result, there
is significant evidence that they benefit lower-income
families, with poorer families being the most likely to
receive such aid and obtain the most generous offers.3
The federal government provides over three-fourths of
all student aid, which is available to students at both
public and private institutions.
The second form of assistance, which is the focus of
the current discussion, is a tuition subsidy.  Such
assistance reflects the fact that the price that public
universities charge their students does not cover the full
costs of providing that education.  Moreover, unlike
student aid, tuition subsidies are “offered” to students
regardless of their financial need.  Students from both
wealthy and poor families qualify for the subsidy simply
by virtue of their enrollment at a public university.  The
fact that students, regardless of their incomes, do not
bear the full costs of attending college raises a number
of peculiarities in the market for higher education.  In
this paper we discuss these issues from an economic
perspective and develop the case for tuition increases as
the appropriate policy response to address these
inefficiencies.
Our research has far-reaching implications:  In 1992,
public universities in the U.S. received over $35 billion
in state and local appropriations, generated over $14
billion in tuition revenues, and enrolled approximately
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A.  Undergraduate in-state tuition
B.  Undergraduate out-of-state tuition
UK = University of Kentucky
UT = University of Tennessee
UC = University of Cincinnati
PU = Purdue University
OSU = Ohio State University
IU = Indiana University
UNC = University of North Carolina
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Relative Price of
Tuition in Kentucky
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11.3 million students.4  In Kentucky, public universities
enrolled over 121,000 students, obtained $411 million
in state aid, and generated over $197 million in tuition
revenues.  The University of Kentucky alone had a total
operating budget of $1.13 billion, receiving over $345
million in state appropriations in 1996–97, and generated
revenues from tuition in excess of $130 million.5  While
our analysis applies to public institutions all over the
United States, we shall focus here only on higher
education in Kentucky.
This analysis shall take place at four levels.  In
section II, we present some facts about tuition increases
at the University of Kentucky and at comparable
institutions, and discuss the mechanism that is currently
used to determine tuition schedules in Kentucky.  Next,
in section III, we analyze the efficiency of this mechanism
from a variety of perspectives by examining its
implications for equity, competition, and educational
quality.  In section IV, we develop from a public choice
perspective why the (unpopular) case for tuition increases
has been absent from discussions on the future of higher
education.  We conclude with a review of policy
recommendations that may serve as alternatives to the
current system of financing higher education, and
motivate a much needed discussion on higher education
reform in Kentucky.
In this section we present some facts about tuition
increases, both in Kentucky and at public institutions in
surrounding states.  After that, we discuss the current
mechanism by which the Council for Higher Education
(CHE) determines tuition increases.
In Figure 1a and Figure 1b we illustrate the cost of
attending the University of Kentucky (UK) and other
comparable institutions over
the 1985-1994 period.  The
graphs distinguish tuition
costs (in constant 1987
dollars) for in-state and out-of-state undergraduate
students at these schools.  Both in-state and out-of-state
391997 KENTUCKY ANNUAL ECONOMIC REPORT
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tuitions have increased at a much faster rate for the other
universities under review than at the University of
Kentucky.  Therefore, the relative cost of higher education
in Kentucky has decreased significantly since 1985, to
the benefit of UK students and their families.  As a result,
these persons are able to spend a larger portion of their
incomes on consuming other goods and services,
unrelated to higher education expenditures, than the
residents of other states where UK’s benchmark
institutions are located.
Related to the relative decline in tuition costs for
Kentucky over the past decade is an explosion in the
“college premium,” or the additional wages that college
graduates earn over those workers who did not complete
or attend college.  Empirical studies examining these
two sets of persons suggest that college graduates receive
$500,000 to $1,000,000 more than high school graduates
in their lifetimes.  Labor economists who have
investigated the relationship between education and
earnings have found that the wage premium of skilled
workers is 40–50 percent higher than in 1963.  In
Kentucky, the monetary returns to schooling are even
greater than those for the U.S., and this return has been
increasing over time.  For example, in 1994 college
graduates (with only a bachelor’s degree) in Kentucky
earned 60 percent more than high school graduates,
holding all demographic and other characteristics
constant.  In 1988, this premium stood a little over 48
percent, suggesting a 25 percent increase in the returns
to college over a six-year interval.6  In Figure 2,
we demonstrate this increase for Kentucky and
graph the average wages of college graduates to
high school graduates in Kentucky for 1979–93.
The premium received by highly trained workers
such as college graduates is expected to continue,
as the demand for skilled labor grows and as the
expanding international trade rewards the U.S.’s
comparative advantage in such labor.7
The purpose of the above discussion was to
highlight the extent to which the relative price of
tuition in Kentucky has fallen with respect to other
states, and to document the increase in the returns
to college.  In the ensuing analysis, we will appeal
to both facts as we advocate the case for tuition
increases.
In Kentucky, tuition schedules for all public
universities are determined by the Council for
Higher Education (CHE).  CHE’s
formula is as follows:  For each
group of universities (doctoral,
masters, community college),
CHE compares the share of in-state tuition at
comparable benchmark institutions to the per capita
TABLE 1
Tuition and its Percent of State Per Capita Personal Income
(PCPI) at Kentucky’s Benchmark Institutions, 1994–95
Benchmark institution 1994–95 Percent of
tuition state PCPI
University of Virginia $3,724 16.5%
University of Cincinnati 3,234 15.5
Virginia Polytech & State University 3,339 15.0
University of Akron 2,888 13.8
Purdue University 2,798 13.7
Indiana University 2,742 13.5
Virginia Commonwealth University 3,034 13.4
University of Toledo 2,694 12.9
Ohio State University 2,481 11.9
University of Missouri (Columbia) 2,424 11.7
University of Missouri (Kansas City) 2,424 11.7
University of Illinois 2,760 11.6
University of Tennessee 1,830 9.4
West Virginia University 1,332 7.7
Georgia State University 1,526 7.5
University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill) 874 4.4
North Carolina State University 874 4.4
University of Houston 672 3.4
Median 11.8%
The Current
System
incomes in their respective states.  For example, as Table
1 illustrates, the tuition for UK and the University of
Louisville, Kentucky’s two doctoral institutions, is
determined by comparing the ratio of tuition at several
nearby universities to the per capita income in their
respective states.  Note that the tuition schedule for 1996–
97 and 1997–98 in Kentucky was derived by consulting
1994–95 prices in other states.  By this criteria, CHE
determined that the median tuition at other states was
11.8 percent of their average per capita incomes.  It
therefore set tuition at UK and UofL at 11.8 percent of
Kentucky’s per capita income.  Out-of-state tuition is
determined by multiplying the in-state rate by a factor
of three.8  Similar rate-setting mechanisms determine
the tuition schedule at UK and UofL’s professional
schools of law, dentistry, and medicine.  This system of
determining tuition increases has several major
shortcomings:
• Because tuitions are determined only every two
years, a significant portion of the increase will only offset
the effect of inflation.  With annual inflation currently
at 2.8 percent, a tuition increase of only 5.0 percent every
two years cannot offset the effect of higher prices that
universities face, a fact often lost at student rallies that
protest tuition increases.  A more sensible approach
would at the very least implement an inflation-indexed
tuition increase schedule.
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THE CASE FOR TUITION INCREASES
Equity
Considerations
• The rate schedule does not reflect the costs of the
production of higher education.9  Instead, it simply
measures the ratio of tuition prices to per capita incomes
in other states — a crude measure of the “burden” of
higher education in other states two years previous.  If
the real costs of production of higher education are
increasing, independent of inflation, as a result of
recruiting superior faculty and providing better resources
to students, CHE’s formula does not incorporate a means
to charge higher tuition to cover these costs.
Furthermore, if Kentuckians place a higher value on
higher education than residents in other states, and are
therefore willing to pay more for better public
universities, the current system cannot incorporate such
a willingness to pay for better quality.  One consequence
of this deficiency is that the brightest high school
graduates from Kentucky probably leave the state to
attend college.
• CHE’s formula relies on per capita incomes and
tuitions for 1994–95 to determine the tuition schedule
in 1996–97 and 1997–98.  Such an approach overlooks
the fact that during the interim Kentucky’s per capita
income would also have grown.  As a result, Kentuckians
in 1996–97 and 1997–98 can afford more for tuition than
the CHE formula requires.  CHE justifies this deficiency
by illustrating the non-availability of current data on per
capita income as this data are typically lagged by two
years.  While this statement is correct, it makes little
sense to assume that Kentuckians in 1997–98 were only
as well off as West Virginians or Tennesseeans in 1994–
95.  Expectations about inflation and projections of per
capita income growth are readily available and could be
easily incorporated into the calculations.
• CHE’s formula relies on per capita income in
Kentucky as a reasonable measure of the ability of
Kentuckians to afford going to college.  This assumption
holds only if students from the average Kentucky family
are most likely to attend college.  As we illustrate in the
next section, however, students who attend state
universities such as UK typically come from families
with higher incomes than the average family.  Therefore,
while tuition rates are determined by assuming that a
student from the average Kentucky family attends
college, in reality a far more affluent student actually
attends college.  Affluent families are able to afford much
higher tuition charges, and they benefit considerably from
the current tuition formula.
• As a result of the above argument, the current system
of determining tuition schedules is highly regressive —
all Kentuckians pay the taxes that finance higher
education.  A disproportionate share of the tuition subsidy
to higher education, however, is received by more affluent
families. At UK for example, in 1995 only 48 percent of
full-time undergraduates applied for financial aid, and
were determined to be needy.10 Furthermore, because of
the college premium, tuition subsidies only function to
increase disparities in the income distribution.  These
subsidies benefit richer students who, as a result of
advanced training, will go on to earn more than those
who did not attend college.
As the above criticisms demonstrate, there is little
economic logic to justify CHE’s tuition-setting formula.
In the following section, we examine other implications
of the current rate setting regime, which have detrimental
effects for competition and equity.
There are four principal reasons why tuition
subsidies should be reduced and why a tuition increase
should fund this reduction in tuition.  They include
concerns over equity, quality, competition, and efficiency.
Below, we examine each in detail.
Proponents of tuition subsidies are quick to
emphasize their role in correcting equity imbalances.
Typically, they argue that a high ability student from a
poor family should not be prevented
from going to college simply
because of financial constraints.
Society in general, they continue,
has much to gain by subsidizing this person’s education
because he or she will make a much larger contribution
to society than the amount invested in education.  These
proponents also argue that this subsidy should be
extended to all students, regardless of their family’s
income, because education has certain “spill-over” effects
— in other words, all members of society benefit when
any person becomes better educated.  The following
section discusses this argument in detail.
Poor families cannot afford college.
Because college is expensive, poor families often
find it difficult to send their children to college, a problem
magnified by the rapidly increasing costs of going to
college.  Students who do go to college, however, will
eventually have higher incomes than those who did not
(see Figure 2), and therefore, they should be able to
borrow money to go to college and repay those loans
with future earnings.  If low-income students cannot
obtain loans, however, there may be a role for government
involvement to correct this capital market imperfection.
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Efficient
Production of
Education
The argument for equity considerations can be justified
if capital markets are imperfect.11  In this case, however,
a government’s role in higher education is only to remove
such market imperfections.  Providing guaranteed loans
at market interest rates, or even subsidized loans, would
correct this imbalance.12  The case for providing tuition
subsidies to all students, regardless of income levels, does
not follow from the lesser ability of poorer families to
afford college.
Higher education has positive “spill-over” effects.
Economic theory suggests than when there are
external (indirect) benefits from an activity such as higher
education, markets will lead people to invest in less than
the socially efficient quantity of education.  The indirect
benefits may include a more informed electorate, for
example.  Because recipients of higher education may
not fully see the value of being a better informed voter,
they do not fully value their education and may consume
too little education from society’s viewpoint.  Of course,
the direct benefits to higher education, such as higher
productivity in the labor market, are easy to quantify
because we can observe the wages paid to graduates.
With no empirical evidence for these indirect effects of
higher education, however, the external benefits have
proven difficult to quantify.13  After all, how does society
gain from the production of an additional economist or
anthropologist?  Without strong evidence of public gains,
it is hard to rationalize an annual expenditure of over
$400 million of taxpayer money on the basis of alleged
benefits.
There are two unintended consequences of tuition
subsidies that we document in this section.  The first
concerns the burden that public
institutions bear during recession
years as a result of increased
enrollments and lower levels of state
support.  The second discusses the
implications of the current system on the choice of college
major as well as the incentives to graduate within a
reasonable amount of time.
College enrollments are counter-cyclical, meaning
they move in the opposite direction from the business
cycle.  Periods of growing economic activity display
reduced enrollments, whereas economic downturns, or
recessions, see large numbers of students returning to
college.  Economist Gary Becker’s simple model of
human capital accumulation is able to reconcile these
facts:  If students rationally compare the costs and
discounted benefits of attending college, then during
“boom” years, one of the costs of attending college,
forgone wages, increases significantly, as jobs are
relatively easy to find.  During recessions, however, when
jobs are scarce (and forgone wages are lower), it makes
more sense to return to college.
The counter-cyclical movement of college
enrollments has immediate implications for public
universities.  Typically, such universities receive a large
portion of their operating expenses from the state.  For
example the University of Kentucky’s budget for 1996–
97 shows that the state’s contribution to the university
budget was over 30 percent.  Furthermore, for public
colleges in Kentucky, revenues from tuition were only
47 percent of appropriations from the state.14  During a
recession, however, the state’s resources are strained as
a result of lower revenues and larger welfare
disbursements, resulting in lower support to public
Average Weekly Earnings of Kentucky Workers, College
Graduates and High School Graduates Only, 1979–94
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FIGURE 3
universities.  As a result, public universities typically go
through a difficult period during recession years with
substantial cutbacks in expenditures and hiring.  The
counter-cyclical nature of state support, when augmented
with the counter-cyclical college enrollments, places a
significant burden on colleges during recession years.
Much of this situation could be eased with increases in
tuition.  Tuition increases would reduce public schools’
dependence on state financing, and therefore reduce the
impact of the business cycle on them.  To the extent that
these cutbacks during recession years cause public
universities to be viewed as inferior to their private
counterparts, tuition increases will help close one
component of the quality differential between the two
types of schools.15
Subsidizing college tuition also affects the time taken
to graduate by reducing the costs of attending college
for additional years.  Under the current system, tuition
subsidies are given without regard to the amount of time
a student has spent in college.  Therefore, a student is
assured a certain level of support regardless of whether
he or she takes four years or longer
to graduate.  Consequently, it is not
surprising that students at public
universities on average take much
longer to graduate than their peers
at private schools.  These so-called
“nth” year students abound at the
University of Kentucky:  in 1993,
over 50 percent of the graduating
class who were not transfer
students took more than five years
to graduate, with 10 percent of this
group taking over seven years.16
Once again, the fact that neither
students nor their families bear the
full costs of extending
undergraduate careers results in
other members of society having to
bear the costs.  In Figure 3, we
graph the mean time to graduation
for different majors at UK.  Notice
the strong negative relationship
between the time taken to graduate and majors with low
earnings.17  Students with low future earnings are the
ones most likely to extend the time taken to graduate
because their forgone wages (from staying in school
another year) are lower than those of students in other
majors.
Tuition subsidies also affect the choice of college
major.  Following the work of Gary Becker, we assume
that a student’s choice of college major depends on his
or her interests and abilities, the costs of training in that
discipline, and the benefits (both monetary and non-
pecuniary) that accrue to the individual as a result of
that investment over a lifetime.18  Other research has
supported Becker’s conclusions.  Robert Willis and
Sherwin Rosen found that the decision to attend college
is highly sensitive to pecuniary rewards, with a 10 percent
increase in starting salaries translating into a 20 percent
increase in college enrollments.  Similarly, Astin, et al.,
found that 83 percent of college freshmen chose “to get
a better job” as the primary reason for attending college.19
Because students in majors with low market earnings
take longer to graduate, the current system of tuition
subsidies provides a disproportionate subsidy to their
education compared to the education of those who enroll
in more remunerative majors.  As a result, the current
system disproportionately encourages students in majors
with lower financial rewards.  More importantly, by
lowering the cost of staying in college, tuition subsidies
encourage students to remain in college longer than is
necessary for the efficient production of their education.
Together, the current method of financing imposes
significant pressures on Kentucky taxpayers, with little
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return.
The fact that tuitions for public universities in
Kentucky are determined by a central authority such as
CHE has several consequences for the quality of public
higher education in Kentucky.  For example, if a state
university wants to recruit better faculty to stay
competitive with other universities, it will need funding
to pay for these improvements.  The university could
finance an improvement with either
more funds from the state or higher
tuitions.  In view of the discussion in
the preceding section, if the state
cannot afford a larger contribution to a university’s
budget, and if the university is not permitted to raise its
own tuition, then it cannot make improvements necessary
to stay competitive with other institutions.20
To illustrate this argument better, consider the
analysis by Charles Clotfelter in Buying the Best: Cost
Escalation in Elite Higher Education, where he examines
tuition increases at several elite private institutions
(Harvard, Duke, University of Chicago, and Carleton
College).21  Clotfelter concludes that the primary cause
behind higher college costs has not been increasing
faculty salaries but the effort to provide students with
better services, finance large investments in capital
equipment, and improve access for students from lower-
income families.  Likewise, Harold Shapiro, the president
of Princeton University, succinctly writes, “Simply put,
the cost of what we are doing at universities is rising
quickly.”22  If we accept these statements, then Clotfelter’s
book has disturbing ramifications for the future of public
universities.  If they want to stay competitive with their
private counterparts, then they will necessarily have to
undertake the same improvements in quality and service.
If they are unable to pay for such improvements, public
universities must either eliminate or reduce some of their
existing functions, or prepare to provide a lower level of
service.23
An institution such as the University of Kentucky
competes with both the private and public sectors.  As
Figure 1 illustrates, tuition has increased at both groups
of schools.  Arguably, private schools will be able to
finance quality improvements that public schools in
Kentucky will quickly find unaffordable.  Moreover,
recent research in labor economics finds that students
who attend better quality colleges earn higher wages.24
In the absence of greater funding from the state, tuition
increases remain the only solution to the problem of
maintaining and improving quality.  With these
competitive pressures, if institutions such as UK continue
to raise tuition at historic rates, then, in the absence of
increased state funding, they will quickly become
providers of lower quality education.
THE PELTZMAN EFFECT
Kentucky’s tuition subsidies are available only to
those students who enroll in public universities.  Students
attending private schools forfeit the subsidy entirely.  As
a result, public universities become significantly more
attractive to all qualifying students on the basis of price,
sheltering public universities from competition from their
private counterparts.  In
essence, tuition subsidies
grant public colleges quasi-
monopoly rights.  These
schools receive a large portion of their enrollments simply
on the basis of their price advantage, which allows them
to compromise the quality of their services.25
Consequently, public universities do not face the same
inducements to undertake quality improvements as their
private cousins — and they act in ways similar to firms
with monopoly rights.  The lack of competition creates
a complacent environment where large bureaucracies
thrive, and the incentives to remove bad instructors or
eliminate inferior programs is greatly reduced.26
In our view, this may represent the largest loss of
efficiency to the current system of supporting higher
education.  When a private school such as Carnegie
Mellon University loses a student, the school can lose
up to $20,000 a year in tuition.  When the University of
Kentucky loses a student, the loss to the university is
considerably lower.  The implication of this difference
is straightforward:  While Carnegie Mellon obviously
does not retain every student who enrolls, it is more
willing to make greater efforts to retain students than
the University of Kentucky simply because it has so much
more to lose.
In 1973, the University of Chicago economist Sam
Peltzman presented a theoretical model of the impact of
state subsidies on the quality of education.27  The
theoretical predictions of this model are called the
“Peltzman effect,” and refer to the tendency of families
to spend less on education after the introduction of an
education subsidy.
The logic of this model is as follows:  Suppose that
the state provides families with “in kind” subsidies, that
is, the state does not actually give families money for
paying tuition but instead subsidizes institutions of higher
education.  Families then have the option of sending
their children to a public university (where they receive
the subsidy) or to a private university (where they forfeit
it).  Under this structure, lower- and middle-class families
will choose to accept the subsidy and send their children
More Efficient Financing of Higher Education:  The Case for Tuition Increases
Reduced Competition
and Monopoly PowerImplications for
School Quality
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
44 CENTER FOR BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC RESEARCH
to the public institution.  At the same time, because they
cannot supplement the tuition subsidy to improve the
“quality” of a public education, such families decrease
the total amount of money that they spend on higher
education.  Moreover, students from affluent families who
would have otherwise attended a higher-quality private
school now find the lower-priced public university more
attractive and enroll there.  If the number of such families
is sufficiently large, the overall quality of education
received by students may fall.  The fact that students
may be selecting a lower-quality public institution in
order to receive the subsidy implies a secular lowering
of the return to a college education.
Peltzman’s work, and the considerable empirical
literature that it has generated, are regarded as
commonplace in the economics literature.28  One recent
study by Philip Ganderton found that on average low-
wealth, high-ability students choose a public university
whose students have an average SAT score that is 237
points below that of a private institution they would
choose if they were allowed unconstrained private sector
choices.
Economists use “public choice theory” to explain
the behavior of institutions such as governments,
bureaucracies, and political parties.  By assuming that
such entities seek to maximize an objective function that
depends in part on the private interests of the individuals
that comprise these groups, public choice theory seeks
to develop testable predictions about the behavior of such
groups.  In the context of subsidies to higher education
there are essentially two groups opposed to tuition
increases:  public university administrators and teachers,
and students attending such institutions (along with their
parents).  We shall examine the dissenting views of each
group in detail.
University administrators whose schools benefit
from tuition subsidies are receiving quasi-monopoly
rights to the business of higher education production.
Students and
Families
University
Administrators
and Faculty
THE OPPONENTS OF TUITION INCREASES
As discussed earlier, they are
guaranteed enrollments simply
because of the tuition subsidy:  it is
impossible for middle-class families
to afford the full price of private schools or out-of-state
tuition at other public universities.29  Because of the
immense price advantage that public support provides,
public institutions do not have to compete with private
schools on the basis of price.30  They are essentially the
sole producers of “higher education.”  This fact translates
into lower incentives for administrators and faculty to
improve their institutions or teaching.  Tuition increases
at public schools would reduce their monopoly power by
making private options relatively more attractive on the
basis of price.  In such an environment, the hostility of
university administrators and faculty to tuition increases
is intelligible:  Just as the subsidized wheat farmers of
the plains favor their subsidies to their industry,
university professors and administrators enjoy the subsidy
to their “industry.” 31
Tuition increases obviously affect the interests of
both the students who attend public universities and their
parents, for they reduce the amount of
money that could be used to finance
the consumption of other goods.  All
the families who benefit from the
current subsidy would be worse off as a result of higher
tuitions.  We emphasize once again that the issue here is
not the welfare of such families, but the level, or quality,
of higher education in the economy.  Students at public
institutions are quick to organize themselves into vocal
rallies and anti-tuition campaigns at the suggestion of a
potential increase.  Their ability to organize themselves
into effective pressure groups is far superior to that of
the taxpayers who bear the costs of their indulgent
protests.
In this paper we have studied the case for tuition
increases at public institutions from a number of
perspectives. We have described the rationale for
determining tuition schedules in Kentucky and have
demonstrated various consequences of the current system.
Insofar as higher education in the state should be
subsidized because certain students are financially
constrained, it makes little sense to provide that subsidy
to all students regardless of income levels.  Eliminating
the “need-blind” component of the tuition subsidy would
be the first requirement of any response to the current
problem of funding.  It would also free up millions of
dollars of revenues that could be returned to taxpayers
More Efficient Financing of Higher Education:  The Case for Tuition Increases
Eliminating the “need-blind”
component of the tuition subsidy
would be the first requirement of
any response to the current
problem of funding.
CONCLUSIONS
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
451997 KENTUCKY ANNUAL ECONOMIC REPORT
or used for expenditures in other areas of need.
To conclude our discussion of the case for tuition
increases we propose two policy recommendations:
Implement a voucher system for higher education that
applies to both public and private universities.
Rather than simply giving institutions an allocation, we
propose tying the money directly to the student through
a voucher.  A university would select the tuition payment
it charges, and students would pay the tuition with a
voucher as well as a direct payment.  Thus, if the
University of Kentucky chooses to charge $9,000 a year
and the Commonwealth chooses to provide the student
with a voucher of $4,000, the student would be required
to pay the remaining $5,000 directly.  To force public
schools to be more competitive, we propose extending
this vouchers to both public and private schools in the
Commonwealth.
Make the vouchers need-based.
If economic efficiency and improved access to higher
education for poor families are the goals of Kentucky
policymakers, then the voucher system for higher
education should be need-based. 32  This system would
reduce the burden on the state from not having to
subsidize all public university students and expand the
choices and opportunities of students from poorer
families. Additionally, we propose the implementation
of strict but reasonable time limits on the number of years
that the vouchers may be received.
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More Efficient Financing of Higher Education:  The Case for Tuition Increases
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
46 CENTER FOR BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC RESEARCH
and Labor Relations Review 41 (1988): 418-29.
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Paper, 1996.
25 A massive reduction in quality would of course send the best students
elsewhere.  Public universities also run excellent honors programs for
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group are the American Federation of Teachers, American Association
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important sources of reasonably priced inputs for many
manufacturers.  Imports also provide incentives for
domestic producers to economize and innovate, and so
act to spur economic growth.  Furthermore, imports free
up resources — such as workers, managers, and financial
capital — from such sectors as the shoe, textile, and
furniture industries.  Those resources are eventually used
in sectors where Kentucky firms are competitive.  As
shown in the 1989 Kentucky Annual Economic Report,
Kentucky’s exports are typically found in higher-wage
sectors.
Investment in Kentucky by foreigners also continued
to grow in the early 1990s.  Jobs provided by foreign-
affiliated firms in the state rose by 10.8 percent from
1991 to 1995.  By 1995 these firms were providing over
61,000 jobs, almost six percent of total Kentucky jobs,
and higher than the U.S. average.  With those jobs often
comes training and the transfer of technology, and, in
the case of the Toyota assembly plant in Georgetown,
very valuable publicity for the state, providing a further
impetus to the state’s economic growth.
In this article, I first look at the boom in exports
from 1991–95.  Subsequent sections analyze
manufacturing and agriculture exports.  Last, I examine
the impact of foreign investment in Kentucky during
the first half of the 1990s.
The boom in merchandise exports for the U.S. and
Kentucky in the late 1980s continued in the first half of
The Internationalization of
the Kentucky Economy
Michael Webb
In the 1980s and continuing into the 1990s, Kentucky has seen a growing export boom,
driven largely by automobiles and industrial machinery.  Direct merchandise exports
account for about seven percent of state income.  Including indirect exports, which are
Kentucky products processed elsewhere, that number probably doubles.  In addition, by
1995 foreign-affiliated firms were providing almost 61,000 jobs in Kentucky.  While
manufactured exports have increased, Kentucky agricultural goods and commodities fell
during the first half of the 1990s.  Most of the goods exported from Kentucky went to
Canada and East Asia, which replaced Western Europe as the second most important
destination.  Likewise, Canadian and Japanese firms have been the key new foreign investors
in Kentucky from 1991 to 1995, respectively providing 33 percent and 42 percent of the
rise in foreign investment.
The rapid internationalization of the Kentucky
economy that began in the mid 1980s continued into the
1990s, with the state’s export boom picking up pace.  At
the same time, foreign investment in Kentucky continued
to grow.
Kentucky’s export boom — especially in
manufactured goods — continued into the mid-1990s,
primarily fueled by exports of automobiles and industrial
machinery.  Direct merchandise exports alone provided
over seven percent of state income.  If we account for
indirect exports, which are processed elsewhere before
being exported, it is likely that the contribution to income
exceeds 14 percent.  And this does not account for the
export of services from Kentucky.  Exports provided jobs
for a substantial number of Kentuckians, especially for
those in higher-end manufacturing.  Lower-end
manufacturing, relying on lower-wage workers, and
agriculture, did not participate in the export boom to the
same degree.
Imports continued to flow into the U.S. in the first
half of the 1990s.  Although import data are not available
for states, Kentucky was certainly a full participant in
the expansion of imports during the 1991–95 period.  It
is clear that imports provide important consumer goods
that enable the wages of Kentucky workers to go further.
But are imports good for everyone?  Obviously, no:  some
workers who lose their jobs will have trouble finding
other work and experience economic hardship.  At the
same time, imports provide the Kentucky economy with
INTRODUCTION
THE KENTUCKY EXPORT
BOOM OF THE 1990S
I thank Kathleen Toma for excellent research assistance with this article.
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the1990s.  For Kentucky, the export boom picked up its
pace and outstripped U.S. growth.  The 1991–95 growth
in Kentucky merchandise exports averaged over 11
percent a year, yielding a 52 percent growth rate for the
entire period.  As a result, these exports moved from
just over five percent of state income to over seven
percent, as illustrated in Figure 1.  This compares with
smaller export growth for the U.S. as a whole, with
merchandise exports increasing from just under eight to
below nine percent of U.S. income in 1995.
Export growth was especially vibrant in
manufacturing.  Manufactured exports rose by 88 percent
from 1991 to 1995 at a 17.1 percent pace of annual
growth.  Chemical exports grew by 23 percent at a 5.3
percent annual growth rate.  Both values far exceed the
U.S. annual growth rate for the 1991–95 period.  On the
other hand, exports of the smaller agriculture and mining
sectors continued to fall:  agriculture exports fell by 37
percent and mining exports by 43 percent.
It is important to note that the seven percent figure
for Kentucky substantially understates the impact of
merchandise exports on the state because it includes only
direct exports.  Many of the goods produced in states
Export growth was especially
vibrant in manufacturing.
Manufactured exports rose by 88
percent from 1991 to 1995 at a
17.1 percent pace of annual
growth.
like Kentucky are subsequently shipped to
plants located on the east or west coast, and
then assembled and exported from there.  We
are not able to account for these goods, but
evidence suggests that the inclusion of
indirect exports more than doubles the
contribution of exports to Kentucky.
There are no data on the export of
services at the state level.  For the U.S. as a
whole, exports of services rose by 17.5
percent from 1991 to 1995, and in 1995 stood
at almost 22 percent of total U.S. exports.
We would expect Kentucky service exports
to have grown accordingly.  Growth in
services was hampered by foreign restrictions
on service imports, and U.S. trade policy has
focused on reducing foreign barriers, with
some success.
Already in 1991, the year for
which we have the most recent U.S.
export-employment data, exports
were providing 16.6 percent of
Kentucky manufacturing employment — 8.1 percent
from direct exports and 8.5 percent from indirect
exports.1  With over 70 percent growth in manufactured
exports by 1995, we should expect that exports were
contributing over 28 percent of Kentucky manufacturing
employment by the mid-1990s..
The sectoral distribution of the expansion in the
1990s is provided in Table 1.  While the growth in
Kentucky exports is primarily due to expansions in two
sectors, a wide array of industries experienced the
Kentucky export boom of the first half of the 1990s.
A key contributor to the dramatic growth in
merchandise exports was the transportation equipment
sector.  Exports of  automobiles and auto parts expanded
throughout the period.  With an annual growth rate for
exports greater than 26 percent, auto equipment exports
grew by 154 percent over the 1991–95 period.  By 1995,
exports stood at $2 billion (1995 dollars) and accounted
for a substantial 34 percent of Kentucky exports, as
illustrated in Table 1.  The growth is most strongly linked
to the expansion of the Toyota manufacturing facility in
Georgetown but also to the strong rise in auto production
elsewhere; employment in this sector in the Louisville
area rose by 44 percent during the four years.
The second key contributor to the export boom was
the growth in Kentucky’s manufacturing industry in the
Northern Kentucky–Louisville–Lexington triangle.  The
impressive expansion showed up in four sectors.
Industrial machinery, which accounts for 16 percent of
Kentucky exports, grew by 29 percent during 1991–95.
This was associated with rapid growth in the machine
Kentucky’s
Manufactured
Exports
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FIGURE 1
Direct Merchandise Exports as a Percent of Income, 1991–
95
Source: Survey of Current Business, 1996.
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tool sector, and U.S. production is largely clustered in
the Cincinnati area and in the Kentucky “triangle.”
Electronic equipment exports, providing six percent of
the Kentucky total exports, grew by 52 percent for the
period — probably the result of expanding exports into
Europe and Asia by Lexmark, a Lexington-based
producer of computer printers.  Two smaller
manufacturing sectors that enjoyed substantial export
growth rates over the period were primary metals with
77 percent growth (over 15 percent annually) and
fabricated metal products, with 68 percent growth (almost
14 percent annually).
Direct exports of Kentucky agriculture totaled
$184.3 million in 1955, while direct plus indirect exports
were substantially greater at $868.9 million.2  The much
larger number associated with indirect
exports reflects the processing of
tobacco and other commodities from
Kentucky that occurs in other states
before being exported.  The
performance of Kentucky’s direct agricultural exports
in 1991–95 did not match the performance of its
manufactured goods.  In fact, direct livestock exports
fell by 35.6 percent and crop exports fell by 80 percent.
State data show that direct plus indirect exports also
fell.  Unmanufactured tobacco and live animals, which
include horses, still constitute the majority of exports
(see Figure 2)  but fell by 23 percent and 24 percent,
respectively, over the 1991–1995 period.  Two smaller
sectors registered export gains:  Soybeans and related
product exports increased by nearly 17 percent from
1991–94, almost a 4.5 percent annual growth rate.  And
feed grains and products increased by about 21 percent,
though this growth mostly occurred in 1995.
It is clear from Table 2 that the export boom of the
early 1990s was fueled by exports to Canada and East
Asia, which replaces Western Europe as the second-
largest importer of Kentucky merchandise exports.
Canada is the most important destination of
Kentucky exports, taking almost 40 percent of the total.
The largest component of U.S. trade with Canada is in
automobiles and auto parts, and it is reasonable to assume
that this holds true for Kentucky exports as well.
Moreover, export growth to Canada was substantial, at
127 percent from 1991–95.  This is likely due to the
explosion in automobile production and export from
Kentucky discussed previously.  It is unlikely to have
been affected by the North American Free Trade Act
(NAFTA) because trade between the U.S. and Canada
was already largely unrestricted.  One possible factor for
the increase may have been the reduction in restrictions
on hauling goods from the U.S. into Canada that occurred
in the late 1980s.
East Asia accounts for 26.6 percent of Kentucky
exports, with Japan taking almost 15 percent of the total.
Moreover, Kentucky exports to the region rose by 62
percent over the period.  The two largest East Asian
customers for Kentucky goods also increased their
imports from the state, Japan by 56 percent and Korea
The Internationalization of the Kentucky Economy
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FIGURE 2
Kentucky Agriculture Exports, 1995
Source: Kentucky Agricultural Statistics Service
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TABLE 1
Sectoral Distribution and Growth in
Kentucky Merchandise Exports, 1991–95
Share of Kentucky 1991–1995 export
Industry 1995 exports growth rate
Manufacturing 84.3% 71.7%
Transportation equipment 34.4 154.0
Industrial machinery 15.7 29.5
Electronic, electric equipment 5.6 51.9
Fabricated metal products 5.5 82.3
Food and kindred products 5.5 170.3
Primary metals 3.2 76.8
Instruments and related
products 1.3 42.8
Other 26.3 36.0
Chemicals and allied products 11.2 23.0
Mining 1.4 -49.7
Agricultural production 3.1 -35.8
Source:  Adjustments to data from U.S. Census Bureau, Foreign Trade
Dvision by MISER, 1996.
WHERE KENTUCKY EXPORTS ARE GOING
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by 44 percent.
The third important destination for Kentucky
merchandise exports is Western Europe, which took
almost 23 percent of Kentucky exports in 1995.  While
none of the countries’ imports match those of Japan,
three countries — France, United Kingdom, and
Germany — provide substantial markets for Kentucky
exports (most goods going to the Netherlands will be re-
exported to European and other countries).  The
performance of Kentucky exports to Europe for the period
paralleled the experience for all U.S. exports.  Sluggish
growth and recessions hit France, Germany and the
United Kingdom in the early 1990s, reducing their
demands for imports.
Finally, Mexico and Latin America take a small
share of Kentucky exports.  Mexico accounted for only
2.7 percent of Kentucky exports in 1995 while Latin
America as a whole accounted for 7.6 percent.  In fact,
exports to Mexico actually fell by 11 percent during
1991–95, due to the 1994–95 financial crisis that hit the
country.  In 1995 alone, Kentucky exports to Mexico fell
by 40 percent.  The expansion in exports to Brazil, the
second most important destination of Kentucky exports
in the region, followed a series of fundamental reforms
by the Brazilian government to adopt more market-
oriented and freer trade policies, opening up the Brazilian
market to exports and leading to substantial economic
growth there.
In 1995, foreign-affiliated firms employed over
61,000 workers in Kentucky.  This contrasts sharply with
the 21,000 jobs associated with foreign investment in
1987, when Kentucky’s boom in foreign investment
began, primarily with the establishment of the Toyota
plant in Georgetown.3
By 1988, foreign affiliates were providing just over
four percent of all jobs in the state.  Foreign investment
in Kentucky began to surpass the national figures in
FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN KENTUCKY
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TABLE 2
Destinations of Kentucky Merchandise
Exports, 1991–95
Share of Kentucky Percent change in
exports, 1995 exports,  1991–95
Canada 38.8% 126.8%
East Asia 26.6
Japan 14.6 56.0
Korea 2.7 44.2
Australia 2.0 120.0
Hong Kong 1.6 89.0
Taiwan 1.3 26.8
Western Europe 20.0
France 5.5 -10.5
United Kingdom 4.1 5.2
Germany 4.0 -8.8
Netherlands 2.9 9.5
Italy 1.8 18.0
Belgium 1.7 -39.6
Latin  America 4.7
Mexico 2.7 -11.3
Brazil 2.0 280.7
Source: MISER, 1996.
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FIGURE 3
Share of Private Employment by Foreign Investors
in Kentucky and the U.S., 1988–94
Source:  Survey of Current Business Statistics, May 1996, and
MISER, 1996.
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FIGURE 4
Total Foreign Investment in Kentucky,
Kentucky Employment by Origin
Source:  MISER, 1996.
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1990, and the gap has since widened.  From 1991 to
1995, employment by new foreign affiliates rose by 10.8
percent (this does not include increasing employment
by existing foreign affiliates).  A recent upturn in foreign
investment in 1994 through mid-1996 has provided a
9.9 percent increase in Kentucky employment related to
foreign affiliates in less than three years.
Kentucky’s attractiveness to foreign investment is
due to the reputation of its workforce, its location, and
the manufacturing boom that has characterized the state.
Foreign investment in Kentucky is led, of course, by the
The Internationalization of the Kentucky Economy
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FIGURE 5
Kentucky Employment by New
Foreign Investment, by Origin
Source:  Kentucky Cabinet for Economic Development.
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Toyota plant, which employs 7,000 workers.  The Toyota
facility is supplemented by investments from other
Japanese firms throughout the state, many of them
working as suppliers for Toyota.  In fact, 42 percent of
new foreign investment (approximately 2,500 jobs) in
the state during 1991–95 was by Japanese firms, and the
majority of these were in the automobile sector.
Foreign investment from Western Europe contributes
the greatest share of Kentucky employment, as illustrated
in  Figure 4.  The United Kingdom provides the largest
source of foreign investment in the state, contributing
18 percent, while Western Europe as a whole provides
48 percent.  This is mostly in basic manufacturing:
metals, plastics, and similar industries as well as the
automobile sector.  East Asia provides 32 percent of
foreign investment, led by Japan at 27 percent.  Most
Japanese investment, of course, is in the automobile
industry.
The key new foreign investors in Kentucky during
1991–1995 have been from Japan and Canada (see Figure
5).  Japanese firms provided 42 percent of the rise in
foreign investment during the period, while Canadian
firms contributed another 33 percent.  Western Europe
provided only 20.2 percent of the increase.  Comparing
Figures 4 and 5, it is clear that the primary origin of
foreign investment, like the primary destination of
Kentucky exports, is shifting away from Europe and
toward East Asia and Canada.  This is reflected in the
sectors in which new investments are to be found —
more than half in the automobile sector (see Figure 6).
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FIGURE 6
Kentucky Employment Due to New Foreign
Investment, by Industry Sector
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FOOTNOTES
1 Exports from Manufacturing Establishments 1990-1991, U.S.
Department of Commerce, 1994.
2 Data on direct plus indirect exports of Kentucky agriculture goods comes
from Kentucky Agricultural Statistics, Kentucky Agricultural Statistic
Service.
3 Foreign investment data for Kentucky are from the Kentucky Cabinet
for Economic Development.
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